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THE RELIABILITY OF INTERNAL ACCOUNTING 
CONTROL SYSTEMS; DESIGN AND ANALYSIS
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
In general there are two kinds of internal controls - 
administrative controls and accounting controls. There is no 
distinct demarcation between the two types of controls. In 
fact their functions are not mutually exclusive as can be seen 
from the following definitions by the AICPA (SAS No. 1 % 320.27 
and % 320.28):
Administrative control includes, but is not limited to, 
the plan of organizationand the procedures and records 
that are concerned with the decision processes leading to 
management's authorization of transactions. Such authoriza­
tion is a management function directly associated with the 
responsibility for achieving the objectives of the organi­
zation and is the starting point for establishing accoun­
ting control of transactions.
Accounting control comprises the plan of organization . 
and the procedures and records that are concerned with 
the safeguarding of assets and the reliability of finan­
cial records and consequently are designed to provide rea­
sonable assurance that:
a. Transactions are executed in accordance with manage­
ment's general or specific authorization.
b. Transactions are recorded as necessary (1) to permit 
preparation of financial statements in conformity 
with generally accepted accounting principles or any 
other criteria applicable to such statements and (2)
2to maintain accountability for assets,
c. Access to assets is permitted only in accordance with 
management's authori zation.
d. The recorded accountability for assets is compared 
with the existing assets at reasonable intervals and 
appropriate action is taken with respect to any dif­
ferences.
The present study concerns accounting controls. Such
controls play important roles in the financial information
system. Yu and Neter (1973) describe them as follows;
The primary purpose of incorporating a set of inter­
nal controls in the financial information system is to en­
hance the system's reliability- i.e., to maintain a high 
probability of preventing, detecting, and eliminating er­
rors, irregularities and fraud in the financial information 
system.
It is well accepted that a more reliable control system 
provides a better quality of output. Recognizing this, the 
American Institute of CPAs has incorporated (AICPA 1973) an 
evaluation of the reliability of the internal controls as a 
requirement for attest audits. The reliability of the inter­
nal control system helps the external auditor determine the 
extent and nature of substantive audit tests. More reliable 
systems require less extensive substantive testing by the audi­
tor.
The Institute of Internal Auditors has also recognized 
the importance of internal controls and has incorporated this 
concept in its definition (given below) of the nature of the 
responsibilities of the internal auditors (Brink, Cashin and 
Witt 1973):
Internal auditing is an independent appraisal activity 
within an organization for the review of operations as a 
service to management, It is a managerial control which 
functions by measuring and evaluating the effectiveness 
of other controls.
Furthermore, it is evident from the objectives of in­
ternal auditing (Brink, Cashin and Witt 1973) that the main 
tasks of an internal auditor are to assist management to de­
sign effective and efficient internal control systems and 
evaluate independently their effectiveness and efficiencies,
e.g., reliabilities:
The objective of internal auditing is to assist all 
members of management in the effective discharge of their 
responsibilities, by furnishing them with analyses, apprai­
sals, recommendations and pertinent comments concerning 
the activities reviewed. ... The attainment of this over­
all objective involves such activities as:
- Reviewing and appraising the soundness, adequacy, and ap­
plication of accounting, financial, and other operating 
controls, and promoting effective control at reasonable 
cost.
- Ascertaining the extent of compliance with established 
policies, plans, and procedures.
- Ascertaining the extent to which company assets are ac­
counted for and safeguarded from losses of all kinds.
- Ascertaining the reliability of management data developed 
within the organization.
- Appraising the quality of performance in carrying out 
assigned responsibilities.
- Recommending operating improvements.
A problem confronting an auditor, whether he is an ex­
ternal or internal auditor, is the evaluation of the reliabili­
ty of an internal control system. A traditional approach is 
to use questionnaires, flow charts, and tests of transactions
4for evaluation purposes (Loebbecke and Zuber 1980, see also 
Felix 1981 for recent works). With the exception of statis­
tical attribute sampling tests, these methods do not provide 
objective and quantitative evaluation; they depend on sub­
jective judgments (Yu and Neter 1973). The main purpose of 
this study is to develop reliability models for internal con­
trol systems that would help analyse, compare and evaluate such 
systems in a more objective manner. Further elaboration on the 
purpose of this study is presented later in this chapter.
The remainder of this chapter is divided into four 
sections. The first section deals with the research issues 
and the statement of the problems associated with existing 
reliability theories as applied to internal accounting control 
systems. The second section descusses the purpose and signi­
ficance of the study. The third section presents a review of 
the previous works that are pertinent to the present study.
The fourth section summarizes the advantages of developing 
reliability models using the current approach.
A. Statement of the Problem 
In recent years, interest in the study of internal ac­
counting control systems using reliability theory has grown.
The common trend seems to be to apply reliability results from 
engineering to internal control systems without being critical
about the basic differences between the two systems (i.e. en­
gineering systems^ and internal accounting control systems). 
Such an approach may lead to problems. As stated by Mautz
5and Sharaf (1964, pp. 15-16):
... successful adoption of this kind requires an under­
standing of the subject's own problems as much as an un­
derstanding of the nature of the borrowed tools. Rarely 
are ideas and methods in other fields such that they can 
be accepted without some modification.
In an auditing context they (Mautz and Sharaf 1964,
p. 16) also state that:
... in order to successfully adopt sampling techniques in 
audit verification, serious attention must be given to the 
nature of business data and the characteristics which dif­
ferentiate them from the data of other fields of inquiry. 
Unless this principle is kept under continuous study in 
theory and observed in practice, more harm than benefit 
may result.
In the present context, Bodnar (1975) seems to have 
borrowed reliability results from engineering for application 
to internal accounting control systems with a paradoxical re­
sult. He states (Bodnar 1975, p. 756):
... fewer rather than more people (controls) increase re­
liability. This is in direct contrast to traditional 
views on internal control (dual control (see Sec. III.C 
for definition) in particular), and was difficult to de­
fend as it goes against "common sense".
Bodnar believes that the product rule in probability 
theory is responsible for this paradox. However, I believe 
that a proper reliability theory which takes basic differences 
in accounting and engineering systems into account may, when 
developed exclusively for internal accounting control systems, 
provide results that are free from paradoxes. In the light 
of the statements by Mautz and Sharaf presented earlier, the 
reason for the paradox may not be the product rule as pointed 
out by Bodnar (1975), but an improper theoretical mapping of 
the engineering properties to the accounting control components.
2
The following list presents the important differences 
between the properties of models borrowed to date from engi­
neering and properties related to accounting control systems;
(i) In engineering systems^, no direct human interac­
tion is considered, whereas in an internal control 
system (ICS) human interaction may be present at 
any stage.
4
(ii) Elements of an engineering system either work or 
do not work; they have no decision making capabili­
ties (Barlow, Proschan and Hunter 1965, and Amstadter 
1971). Whereas the elements of an ICS, not only 
work or not, but also have, in general, decision 
making capability (Cushing 1974).
(iii) The reliability characteristic of an engineering 
component is given by one parameter (for a given 
failure mode) which represents the probability that 
the component works properly (see any book on the 
mathematical theory of reliability for engineering 
systems, e.g. Barlow, Proschan and Hunter (1965) 
and Amstadter (1975)1. It is also considered to be 
independent^ of the input. Whereas, the reliability 
characteristic of an ICS element has to be given, 
in general, by several parameters which represent:
(a) probability that the control element is in op­
eration , (b) the probability that the element works 
properly given that it is in operation and the in­
put information is cotfect, and (c) the probability 
that the element works properly given that it is 
in operation and the input information is incorrect 
(some of these concepts are discussed by C Cushing 
(1974) and Soliman (1979)). Furthermore these 
parameters, in general, depend on the state of the 
input information (Cushing 1974), unlike the re­
liability parameters of engineering components.
4
(iv) An engineering system , usually contains one kind 
of component, whereas an ICS contains two kinds of 
components : one that just completes a procedure
without ^ y  décision feature and one that not only 
completes a procedure but also makes a decision 
based on the state of the input information (see 
chapter II for details).
These differences have important implications for model­
ing and specifying reliability systems in the two domains 
(Engineering and Accounting). For example, a parallel switch 
circuit in an electronic system has the following reliability, 
R, that a current will flow through the unit:
'2
R = 1 - (1- R^ ) (1 - Rg) = R^ + Rg - Rj^ Rj
8That is, output flow reliability, R is equal to unity less 
the chance, (1 - R^)(l - Rg) that both parallel switches will 
fail to allow current to flow.
In the case of an ICS, an equivalent diagram might be:
where one,channel is a redundant® channel and the reliabili­
ties of the output information from the two channels are Rj^ 
and Rg. For a control purpose the information from the two 
channels are compared and corrected (in case of a discrepancy) 
at the junction component (i.e. a component with two or more 
input channels). The control component at the junction is not 
considered in the current literature. Instead the reliability 
of this unit is taken from the engineering result as R = 1 - 
(1 - R^)(1 - Rg) (Barrett, Baker and Ricketts 1977, pp. 37-38). 
This approach implicitly assumes that: (a) the element at the 
junction works correctly with 100% accuracy when one or both 
pieces of the input information are correct, and (b) it does 
not work properly at all when both inputs are incorrect (see 
Section II.C.2.b for detailed discussion).
In general this will not be true in ICS's. The relia­
bility of the output information, in this case, will not only 
depend on R^ and Rg but also on the reliability vector Q (see 
Section II.C.2.b) of the component at the junction. The conse­
quences of this incongruity in reliability mapping properties
9have not been investigated fully. Their impact on the manage­
ment, control and audit of accounting systems is unknown.
B. Purpose and Significance of the Study 
The purpose of this study is to develop and discuss 
the basic concepts for internal accounting control processes 
and to use these concepts to develop a reliability theory for 
internal accounting control systems. First the basic compo­
nents of an internal accounting control system will be identi­
fied and the corresponding reliability models will be devel­
oped. Second, the reliability models of more complex systems 
will be developed using the models of the basic components as 
building blocks. The potential utility of studying the sensi­
tivity of internal accounting control systems to changes in de­
sign and/or reliability of components will also be addressed, 
from the perspectives of both internal and external audit objec­
tives. Finally a field study will be reported to support em­
pirically three representative theoretical models.
The study provides the formal explanation necessary to 
compare the relative reliabilities of alternative control sys­
tem designs. It also offers the opportunity to compare the 
cost effectiveness of alternative control systems.
In addition, the study performs sensitivity analyses 
on the reliabilty models of two control systems in order to 
identify the most and the least important elements of those 
control systems, and to compare the reliabilities of alter­
native control system designs. A component is said to be
10
important if a small increase in the value of its reliability 
parameter causes a relatively large increase in the output 
reliability in comparision to similar increases caused by the 
same percentage increase in the value of other component para­
meters.
The above information seems to be very useful for both 
internal and external auditors. The internal auditor can use 
these results to effectively manage time and resources to im­
prove the output reliability. This can be achieved by improv­
ing reliability of the relatively more important components, 
by providing personnel training, and/or replacing machines.
The external auditor can use the sensitivity results in making 
a decision about the required precision of reliability esti­
mates for individual components when evaluating the overall re­
liability of a system. A more important component may need a 
more accurate estimation of its reliability to obtain a more 
precise evaluation of overall reliability. Sensitivity analy­
sis can be used to target the most cost effective investigation 
and/or redesign strategies when resource constraint prevent 
involvement with more than one or a few individual system's 
component. The auditor can also investigate the potential 
for error in decisions related to the use of overall relia­
bilities by considering the sensitivity of such decisions to 
the precision of available component reliability estimates.
C. Background Research 
There are two types of research works pertinent to the 
present study. First, empirical works that show that the 
traditional approach leads to incoherent decision outcomes. 
Second, studies that use quantitative models for analyzing 
and evaluating internal accounting controls.
In the first category of work, Weber (1978), while 
studying auditor's decision making on overall system reli­
ability, concluded that the auditors did not carry out the as­
sessment in a uniform manner. Joyce (1976), in an earlier 
study, also found that significant difference exists between 
individuals' judgments. There are several recent empirical 
studies (e.g. Ashton and Brown 1980, Weber 1980, and Mock and 
Turner 1981) that support the same view. Recently, Mock and 
Turner (1981), in a comprehensive empirical study of internal 
control evaluation and auditor judgment, came to a similar 
conclusion, i.e. the present approach (using questionnaires 
and interviews) for evaluating internal controls leads to 
incoherent audit judgments, as seen in the following ex­
cerpt (Mock and Turner 1981, p. 122):
... the actual sample size decision and rationale docu­
mentation exhibited a great deal of variability among 
auditors. Variability was observed in terms of factors 
that are inputs into auditor's sample size recommendations, 
including their interpretation of the nature (substantive, 
compliance, dual purpose) of the audit procedure, their 
judgments about appropriate alpha risk, beta risk, and ma­
teriality, the relevance of various internal control 
strengths and the amount of the reliance that they were 
willing to place on the compliance tested strengths, and 
their information search strategies, as evidenced in a 
protocol study.
11
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Thus, it appears that the subjective nature of the pres­
ent approach to internal control evaluation is an inherent 
weakness in the usual audit process. To eliminate some of 
the problems associated with subjective evaluation, researchers 
have explored more objective procedures. For example, one 
could consider mathematical models of internal control systems 
having different control 'components' with determinable relia­
bilities. These reliabilities of different control components 
could then be combined to yield the overall reliability of the 
system. However, there are two very basic questions that 
arise at this stage. The first one regards the process of 
objectively and cost effectively evaluating the reliability 
of an individual control 'component', and the second one con­
cerns the methodology to be used in combining these individual 
reliabilities for determining the overall reliability of the 
system. While very little effort has been expended to answer 
the first question, a considerable amount of effort has been 
devoted to the second question. The research works pertaining 
to the latter question are summarized below.
1. Yu and Meter's Wotk 
Yu and Neter (1973) developed a stochastic reliability 
model of an internal control system by treating the quality of 
accounting data as a stochastic variable and the flow of error 
states as a stochastic process. The model basically deals with 
the flow of error in an accounting information system. Each 
operating element of the system has some propensity to introduce.
13
change and eliminate errors in the input information. This 
propensity depends on the error state of input information 
and on the characteristic of the operating element. Yu and 
Neter have expressed these propensities of an element to in­
troduce, change and eliminate a given error in the input in­
formation in terms of probabilities.
They have considered two types of operating elements.
One, where the element performs only a transformation opera­
tion i.e. it converts input data into output in accordance 
with certain rules. The other, where the element performs a 
decision operation. According to Yu and Neter, the decision 
operation performs basically a sorting function. It allocates 
information to various output classifications each of which 
requires à different action.
For elements performing transformation operations, the 
propensities to introduce, change and eliminate error are given 
by the different elements of a 'Transformation Probability 
Matrix,* T. An example using a 4 x 4 matrix is considered by 
Yu and Neter. In that example a payroll clerk performs a trans­
formation operation on payroll data with four error state 
classifications: no errors, monetary error only, non-monetary
error only, both monetary and non-monetary errors. The effect 
of the transformation operation is obtained by multiplying T 
with the 'input vector* (an 'input vector* represents the dif­
ferent probabilities with which the error states are present 
in the input information). The above multiplication yields
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the 'output vector' which represents the probabilities with 
which different error states are present in the output data.
For an element performing a decision operation, the 
propensities to introduce, change and eliminate errors are giv­
en by a 'Decision Probability Matrix,' D. This matrix, in fact, 
consists of two diagonal matrices: one for the correct deci­
sion and the other for the incorrect decision. The effect of 
decision operations on the input data can be obtained by multi­
plying D with the 'input vector'. The resulting vector is an 
'output vector' which, in this case, consists of two vectors, 
one for the correct decision and the other for the incorrect 
decision.
Yu and Neter have also developed models for branching 
operations and merging operations. They have considered two 
types of merging operations. One, where similar documents rep­
resenting separate transactions of different departments are 
merged together. The other, where different documents pertain­
ing to the same transaction are combined to form one complete 
document. They have also modeled feedback operation for cor­
rection.
Thus Yu and Neter modeling provides an objective way to 
evaluate the reliability of output information from an inter­
nal accounting control system knowing the different probability 
matrices (T & D) of the operating elements. However, there 
are several weaknesses with their models that limit their ap­
plicability. These weaknesses are discussed below.
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The assumption that different operating elements are inde­
pendent is not valid in most real situations» Also in the case 
in which different input data ate-merged, thé probabilities with 
which errors are present in the different input data are not nec­
essarily independent of each other. For example, in a disburse­
ment voucher preparation and review process, there are
three input vectors. One for each of the following documents:
1) the Purchase Order (approved), 2) the Vendor's Invoice and 
3) the Receiving Report. The three input vectors are not mu­
tually independent; an error in quantity ordered in a PO (Pur­
chase Order) may create an error in the quantity on the cor­
responding vendor's invoice (from the vendor's point of view 
there is no error, but the customer is not getting what he 
really wanted). Thus, the reliability model developed by Yu 
and Neter for an input vector which is comprised of several 
documents pertaining to the same transaction, is incomplete.
The models developed in the present work incorporate these 
dependencies (see Section B of Chapter V for details).
Yu and Neter have also implicitly assumed that the pro­
pensities of an element to introduce, change and eliminate 
errors from input data are independent of the number of input 
channels. This assumption seems unrealistic because the opera­
ting element may not function the same way as it would in the 
single input case. Also it may use one channel's input to 
make its decision on the accuracy of the input data from the 
other channels. The present work has developed models for
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components with multi-channel inputs, and demonstrated the 
validity of some of the models by conducting a field study.
(see Chapters II, III and V)i
It is interesting to note that the element performing 
a decision operation (as defined by Yu and Neter) can never im­
prove the reliability of the input data even if it were opera­
ting with 100% reliability. This means that the element will 
further contaminate the input data if it is not working correc­
tly in every input case. It appears from this result that the 
system would be more reliable if such decision operations were 
omitted. This is contrary to the control objective.
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2. Cushing's Work
A simple stochastic model adapted from the field of re­
liability engineering (Lloyd and Lipow 1962) was used by Cushing
(1974) to develop reliability models of internal accounting con­
trol systems. Basically the model, like the Yu and Neter models, 
deals with the reliedaility of information as the data flow 
through a system of internal controls. The reliability of the 
output data is given in terms of the reliability of the input 
data and the reliability parameters of the control elements that 
process the input data. The parameters represent the proba­
bility that the element completes the control process correctly 
for given initial conditions.
Unlike Yu and Neter (1973), Cushing has considered two 
steps in the control task: one, where the control element sig­
nals the existence of an error of a given type and the other, 
where the element initiates a proper action for a given error 
signal so that the output data is error free. Cushing has 
further considered that the probabilities of completing the 
abbve tasks depend on the states of the input data. More ex- 
plicity, the probability that the control component signals 
the existence of an error in the input data given that the er­
ror exists (correct functioning of the signaling process) is 
different from the probability that the component signals the 
existence of an error in the input information given that no 
error exists (improper operation of the signaling process). Also, 
when the existence of em error is signaled, the probability of
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taking proper actions so that the output information is error 
free is different in the two cases: I) when the input con­
tains no error and 2) when the input contains an error.
It is interesting to note that the Cushing model is 
equivalent to the Yu and Neter model for the simple one input 
case. This can be demonstrated by combining non-monetary and 
monetary errors in the Yu and Neter model into one type of 
error and by replacing the two step control process (signaling 
and correcting) in the Cushing model by a one step process 
(detection-correction). When the Cushing model is rewritten 
in a matrix form, it takes the same form as that of the Yu and 
Neter model.
Cushing also developed reliability models for control 
systems, representing (a) single control-single error, (b) 
single control-multiple error, (c) multiple control-single 
error and (d) multiple control-multiple error. He also dis­
cussed several extensions of the model and incorporated cost- 
benefit analysis. The cost-benefit analysis provides a deci­
sion tool to management and/or the internal auditor. This 
helps them in making decisions about installing and/or improv­
ing their control system.
While Cushing's work provides reli^ility models for 
simple systems, his approach of using decision trees to develop 
models becomes Very cumbersome in complex cases,e.g. control 
components with multi-channel inputs, control components in 
parallel and etc. Cushing did not develop models for these 
complex cases. A set theoretical approach is used in
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the present study to develop models. This approach is more 
versatile. It provides models for any complex system even 
with interdependent control components and input information 
channels (see Chapters II, III and V).
3. Bodnar's Work
Bodnar (1975) made an attempt to extend Cushing's ap­
proach to develop reliability models for internal control sys­
tems with more complex structures, by considering human behav­
ior in the performance of control tasks. He considered two 
types of systems. One where the control tasks are completed 
by two separate channels (each channel consisting of several 
components in series), with one being redundant. The other, 
where the control tasks are performed in a 'dual' form. Each 
'dual' element consists of two components in parallel; each 
performing a similar task (i.e. one is redundant). The 'dual' 
elements are connected in series to form a 'dual' system.
The reliability model for a 'parallel' system, as given 
by Bodnar, is = 1 - (1 - r^)^ where is the system's re­
liability, r is the component's reliability and n represents 
the number of components in each channel. All the components 
are assumed to be identical in terms of their reliabilities. 
For a 'dual' system, the reliability is = |jL - (1 - r)^J^ 
where n represents the number of 'dual' elements. Again, all 
the components are assumed to have the same value, r, for 
their reliabilities.
It is seen that R and R, both tend to zero as n-^ ^  .p d
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This leads to the paradoxical conclusion that fewer rather 
than more people (controls) increase reliability. Bodnar rec­
ognized this paradox. He explained it partly by the product 
rule in probability theory and partly as a result of human 
behavior (i.e., it is easier for a lesser number of people to 
collude). He pointed out as a result of his study that effort 
is warranted to reduce the number of work stages in order to 
have higher reliability. Also, since his results led to a 
paradoxical conclusion, he asserted that (Bodnar 1975, p. 756): 
”... in many cases, the results of reliability modeling may not 
correspond to common beliefs held by management."
Bodnar did not discuss explicitly his method of devel­
oping models. As mentioned earlier, it appears that he has 
borrowed the reliability results from engineering for simi- 
larily structured systems. This may pose some problems, es­
pecially when the two systems (internal control system and 
engineering system) have the same structure (component wise) 
but differ in their logic flow. There are situations where 
the system has a series structure but the logic is parallel and 
vice versa. For example, a set of capacitors in parallel will 
have a series logic for the set to function i.e. if any capaci - 
tor fails (shorts), all of them fail. Thus, it is important 
that before a result is borrowed from other disciplines based 
on system's structures, the logic flows of the two systems be 
studied. The difference in the logic should then be implemented 
in the model. In fact, a more direct approach would be to look 
for logic similarity between the two systems when borrowing re-
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suits.
In the present work, logic flow technique is used to 
develop the models. Unlike Bodnar's result, this approach has 
yielded results that are in accordance with intuition and com­
mon sense.
4. Other Relevant Works
Stratton (1977, 1981) and Soliman (1979) have also ex­
tended the application of relicdsility theory to more complex 
systems. Their treatments again lack discussion and inclusion 
of all the control features discussed in Chapter I, Section A. 
Soliman (1979) starts with the basic concepts of a control pro­
cess in a control system, but when he derives the reliability 
of a complex system he treats the control components as if 
they were engineering components in the same manner as Bodnar
(1975) and Stratton (1980), i.e. he fails to incorporate the 
different reliability parameters associated with a control 
component into the reliability models of complex control sys­
tems. For example he does not recognize the probability that 
a control component operates correctly given that the input 
information is correct and the control is in operation, P^, 
and the probability that a control component operates correctly 
given that the input information is in. error and the control 
is in operation, P .^ Rather, he uses a single parameter 
(which is independent of the state of the input information) 
for the reliability of a control component in the treatment of 
complex systems (see Soliman 1979, PP. 37, 43 and 46).
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Haitilen (1980) has proposed a linear programming model 
for the design of an internal control system, which minimizes 
a system's cost subject to management established error re-» 
duction probability goals for designated error types. How­
ever, she does not consider the basic problem of combining 
the reliabilities of the individual components.
Vasarhelyi (1980) while examining the nature and multi­
plicity of internal control procedures and errors, briefly 
mentioned the complexities and difficulties involved in com­
bining the reliabilities of internal control components. He 
classified the relationships of different components of an 
internal control system into five groups and suggested that an 
empirical study be conducted in order to answer the question 
of how to combine the reliabilities of the components to find 
the overall system's reliability. In fact, he has given some 
possible analytical relationships for combining the reliabili­
ties when the controls are connected in series and in parallel, 
but has provided no theoretical justification for the relation­
ships .
Baber (1980 and 1981) developed decision theory models 
to determine policies regarding implementation of parallel pro­
cessing accounting controls and investigation of the true value 
of a transaction when a control is (or is not) in operation.
He investigated the nature of optimal policies under various 
assumptions and special cases. While Baber's study is useful 
in formulating control policies by management, it does not pro­
vide a method to combine reliabilities of different control
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elements to obtain an overall reliability of a control sys­
tem; nor does it yield any information about the overall ac­
curacy of an account balance. These omissions are of signifi­
cance to the external auditor when making an audit plan, and 
to the manager and/or the internal auditor when planning and 
designing a more reliable control system. Although the cost- 
benefit of a control system is an important point to consider 
when deciding about implementing the controls in an accounting 
system, it is even more important to know how a given control 
system, with a fixed operating cost, can be made more efficient 
by rearranging the different elements of the control system.
Knechel (1981) has studied the relationship between pro­
cessing errors and aggregate : errors in the financial state­
ment accounts. He determined the distribution of aggregate 
errors under a variety of conditions, e.g. the presence or ab­
sence of certain internal controls and a normal or uniform dis­
tribution of processing errors. In his study, he also illus­
trates the use of simulation techniques for developing these 
distributions. He simulated the errors in a revenue system to 
demonstrate the effect of controls on the aggregate error dis­
tribution, for the analysis and evaluation of internal controls. 
Knechel used Cushing's (1974) reliability models of internal 
controls, for studying the effects of internal controls on the 
distribution of aggregate errors. Since Cushing's reliability 
models are limited to simple control systems, reliability mod­
eling of complex systems seems warranted in order to use Knechel's 
approach in complex internal control situations.
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Recently Weber (1982) extended Cushing's approach using 
reliability theory to develop probability models of internal 
control systems for asset safeguarding and maintenance of data 
integrity. However, his treatment is again limited to very 
simple cases.
From the above discussion, it is evident that consider­
able effort has been expended to develop quantitative models 
for evaluating the reliability of a control system. However, 
very little coherence exists between different works. The 
main reason seems to be a lack of formal concepts associated 
with the control process.
D. Advantages of Reliability Theory
There are several advantages from applying reliability 
theory to internal accounting control systems. Some of these 
advantages are common to all the theoretical approaches that 
provide an objective estimation of the reliability of a sys­
tem; and some are more specific to the particular approach. In 
the following list, I present the specific advantages of the 
present approach along with some of the general advantages.
(i) The present approach is more complete and robust 
compared to previous approaches. Here, the basic 
concepts of a control process are developed in an 
accounting control environment and are used to de­
velop reliability models for the basic systems' 
components that can exist in any accounting control 
system.
25
(ii) The present work uses information flow diagrams 
with proper logic for completion of the control 
process in developing reliability models. The in­
formation flow can be easily drawn by knowing the 
flow of information in the system. In many in­
stances such diagrams are already in existance 
(see e.g. Brink, Cashin, and Witt 1973).
(iii) The present approach is easier to understand. It 
requires only an understanding of the control pro­
cess and some elementary knowledge of probability 
theory.
(iv) In the present approach, reliability models of
complex systems can be easily obtained by combining 
the reliability models of :the basic components of 
a control system.
(v) In general, the reliability parameters of a system's 
components are not assumed to be independent of 
each other in the present work. For example, the 
reliability parameters and (see Table I for 
definitions) of a control component depend on the 
state of the input information. Whereas, in the 
previous works (e.g. Bodnar 1975, Stratton 1977, 
and Soliman 1979) the reliabilities of different 
components are assumed to be independent.
(vi) An external auditor should be able to use the re­
liability models for an objective evaluation of
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the reliability of an internal accounting control 
system when making an audit decision.
(vii) Reliability models can be useful in designing a 
reliable and cost effective internal accounting 
control system. A configuration change (a change 
in the arrangement of a system's components) of 
a system changes the reliability of thë system. 
The effects of such changes on the reliabilty of 
output can be studied in advance using the relia­
bility models developed here. Such an analysis 
is presented in Section B of Chapter IV.
(viii) Sensitivity analysis of a reliability model of an 
internal accounting control system can provide in­
formation useful to both the external and inter- 
nal auditors (see Chapter IV for details).
(ix) Variance analysis can be performed on different 
reliability parameters. This helps management 
determine those parameters that are not up to 
standard.
(x) The field study experience demonstrated that the 
reliability parameters can be easily evaluated 
from past data.
(xi) The present work uses limiting cases which yield 
intuitively appealing results to demonstrate the 
validity of the models.
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(xii) The models developed in previous works are special 
case of more general models developed here (e.g. 
see Chapter III).
CHAPTER II
DEFINITIONS, CONCEPTS AND RELIABILITY 
MODELS OF BASIC COMPONENTS 
This chapter is divided into two sections. The first 
section presents the definitions and concepts associated with 
the terms that are used in this work in developing reliabili­
ty models. The second section is devoted to the development
of reliability models of the basic components of an internal
accounting control system. These models are then used later 
in the work (see Chapter III) as building blocks to develop
reliability models of complex systems.
A. Definitions and Concepts 
Definitions and concepts occupy a key position in any 
theoretical development. Mautz and Sharaf (1964) have empha­
sized that concepts provide a basis for advancement in a field 
of knowledge by facilitating communication about a subject 
matter and its problems. Thus, with this view in mind, I 
begin by defining the terms that are associated with the in­
ternal control process and then discuss the related concepts.
System; A system normally would consist of several 
components (see below); each performing some type of activity 
(or types of activities) in the completion of a control pro-
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cess. An internal accounting system will be referred to, here, 
as a system.
System Component: A system component is an element
(e.g. module, procedure, task) of a structural set of activi­
ties related to accomplishment of end results. Basically there 
are two kinds of system components; Performance components 
and control components.
Performance Component: A system component whose in­
herent purpose contributes directly to completion of a sub­
stantive accounting objective.
Control Component: A system component whose inherent
purpose is prevention, detection, and/or correction of errors.
A 'performance' component is similar to an electronic 
component in an electronic device. Failure of an electronic 
component will cause failure in the electronic device. Similar­
ly, failure of a performance component will introduce sub­
stantive contamination in information as it leaves the compo­
nent. Once the contamination is introduced, only a control 
component can detect it and/or correct it.
A 'control' component is very different; it has no com­
mon analog in electronic systems. As mentioned earlier, con­
trol components are used to prevent errors, if present, in in­
put information. A failure of a control component may arise 
from two sources: one when the component is not working prop­
erly i.e., improper performance or operative failure, and the 
other when the component is not functioning at all - inopera­
tive failure. Operative failure of a control component will
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create and/or introduce substantive contamination. Whereas, 
inoperative failure produces a condition favorable to substan­
tive contamination but will not always create and/or introduce 
error in the output information. In other words, when a con­
trol component is not working at all, then the prevention, de­
tection, and/or correction of error is not possible by that 
component but the output information is not further contamina­
ted as a result of e^osure to the component.
However, when a control component is working, but not 
working properly (operative failure), it may introduce and/or 
create substantive contamination by making wrong judgments.
For instance, a control component with a single input infor­
mation channel can contaminate the output information by de­
tecting and subsequently correcting an 'error* that is not 
present in the input information. Operative failure-may also 
arise from improper correction of properly detected errors in 
input information or by accepting an incorrect input informa­
tion as a correct one. The situations under which an opera­
tive failure occurs become more complex when the control com­
ponent has two or more input information channels. A further 
discussion on this can be found in Sections C.2.b and C.2.c 
of Chapter II.
Reliability of Information: The probability that the
information is error free for a given substantive objective.
This reliability value may change when the substantive objective 
is changed.
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Reliability of a System Component; The probability 
that a particular component completes its process properly for 
a given control objective. In the case of a 'performance'
component, the reliability is expressed by one parameter. How­
ever, in the case of a 'control' component, the reliability 
is expressed by several parameters (Cushing 1974). These par­
ameters are as follows:
(i) The first parameter of the reliability 'vector' of 
a 'control' component for a given control objective 
represents the probability that the control is in
operation. When the control is not in operation,
then the prevention, detection and/or correction 
of error is not possible by that control component. 
Furthermore, the control component will not create 
and/or introduce substantive contamination into the 
input information if it is not in operation.
(ii) The second parameter represents the probability
that the 'control' component operates properly given 
that the control is in operation and the input in­
formation is correct.
(iii) The third parameter represents the probability that 
the 'control' component works properly given that 
the control is in operation and the input informa­
tion is incorrect (see Table I for details).
A list of definitions of the reliability parameters is 
presented in Table I along with the symbols used for those . 
definitions for different situations.
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TABLE I
List of Symbols* Representing Characteristic Probabilities
I. Characteristic Probabilities of 'Performance' Components
A. For Single Channel Input Case;
P = P(Sp) - Probability that a 'Performance' component 
completes its process correctly.
Pj = P(Spj) - Probability that jth performance compo­
nents completes its process correctly.
Pqj  ^= P(Soff/Sp^ Sj^) - Probability that the error in 
the performance process offsets the error in the 
input information given that the input is incor­
rect and the performance component is operating 
improperly.
B. For Multi-Channel Input Case;
Q = P(Sp) - Probability that a performance component
completes its process correctly when multiple 
input information channels are present.
Qj = P(Spj) - Similar to Q except it is for the jth 
performance component.
II. Characteristic Probabilities of 'Control* Components
A. For Single Channel Input Case;
P^ = P(Sw) - Probability that a control component works,
i.e. remains in operation during a control period 
when only one input channel exists.
Pc = P(Sc/Si A Sw) - Probability that a control compo­
nent operates correctly given that the input in­
formation is correct and the control is in opera­
tion.
Pe = P(Sc/§iAS^) - Probability that a control compo­
nent operates correctly given that the input infor­
mation is in error and the control is in operation.
* The symbols as defined in this list stand for one type of 
error.
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TABLE I (CONTINUED)
P - Probability vector for a control component with 
one input channel. It has three elements: Pw» Pc, 
and Pe defined above.
Pwj - Similar to P^ except it is fôr the jth.control 
component.
Pej - Similar to Pc except it is for the jth control 
component.
Pgj - Similar to Pe except it is for the jth control 
component.
Pj - Similar to P except it is for the jth control 
component.
B. For Multi-Channel Input Case:
o = P(S )^ - Similar to P^ , except number of input 
information channels is more than one.
Qc P(Sc/S^ ]^ ns^ 2 '^ * 'ASiaAs*) - Similar to P^ 
but with multiple input channels.
Qle = P(Sc/SilA Si2 - ASw) = P(Sc/SiiA Sig A .. .Sin A 8%)
P(Sc/Siin Si2--- A Sin A Sw) - Probability that 
a control component operates correctly given that 
one of the input channels contains an error in its 
information.
0^ - Probability that a control component operates
correctly given that |c of the input channels con­
tain errors in their information, k may take in­
teger values ranging from 1 to n where n represents 
the total number of input channels.
Q - Probability vector for a control component with 
more than one input information channel:. Its ele­
ments : are : , Qw» Qc» Qle»**Qne where n represents 
the total number of input channels.
Qwj - Similar to Qw except it is for the jth control 
component.
Qcj - Similar to Qc except it is for the jth control 
component.
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TABLE I (CONTINUED)
Q l e j  - Similar to except it is for the jth con­
trol component.
Qkej “ Similar to Qke except it is for the jth control 
component.
Qj -  P r o b a b i l i t y  v e c t o r  f o r  a  c o n t r o l  c o m p o n e n t  a t  t h e  
j t h  j u n c t i o n  i n  a  ' d u a l '  s y s t e m .  T he e l e m e n t s  o f  
t h i s  v e c t o r  a r e ;  Q w j» Q c j ,  Q l e j  a n d  G ^ej"
III. Characteristic Probabilities of Input and Output Infor­
mation :
Ri = P(Si) - Reliability of the input information to a 
component. In other words it represents the pro­
bability that the input information is free from 
a particular error being considered.
Rq = P(Sq) - Reliability of the output information from 
a component, a subsystem or a system.
R^k ~ P(Sik) - Reliability of the input information of 
the kth channel where k may take integer values 
ranging from 1 to n, n being the total number of 
input information channels in parallel.
Rgj - Reliability of the output information from the 
jth component.
C^oj “ Reliability of the output information from the 
jth dual element.
' - Prime is used as a superscript on most of the
symbols listed above when the component is con­
nected in parallel with another component.
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B. General Approach to Quantitative Developwgnt of 
Reliability Models for the Basic Components 
The main purpose of this section is to present a dis­
cussion on the method that has been used in the present study 
to derive reliability models of the basic internal accounting 
control components. The present approach is a little different 
from previous approaches. Cushing (.1974) used a decision tree 
approach whereas Stratton (1977 and 1981) and Soliman (1979) 
used logic diagrams. The present work used a set theoretical 
approach to develop the logic and uses probability theory for 
obtaining reliability models. The following steps illustrate 
the procedures to obtain a reliability model for an assumed 
control objective:
(i) Identify the error type of concern.
(ii) Draw a logic flow diagram of the system, subsystem 
or a system component showing the component(s) and 
the inputs and outputs of the unit.
(iii) Identify the function (functions) of the component 
(components of a system or a subsystem) under study,
(iv) Write down the basic states of the input informa­
tion (i.e. correct or incorrect),
(v) Write down the basic operational and functional 
states of the system components.
(vi) Write down the state of the output information that 
produces correct output.
(vii) Determine all feasible combinations of input infor­
mation (given in (iii)) with the operational and
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f u n c t i o n a l  s t a t e s  i n  C iv) t h a t  p r o d u c e  c o r r e c t  
o u t p u t  i n f o r m a t i o n  r a t h e r  t h a n  e r r o n e o u s  o u t p u t .
This step is important, because a clear understand­
ing of the process is required in order to deter­
mine all the possible mutually exclusive combina­
tions.
(viii) Use probability algebra to transform the above re­
lation between different states to a relation bet­
ween different probabilities of the states. This 
provides the desired reliability model. It should 
be pointed out that in order to understand the 
above procedure, one does not need a detailed under­
standing of probability theory. An understanding 
at an introductory level is sufficient. The follow­
ing theorems are most frequently used in the model 
development process here, and hence it would be nec­
essary to understand these theorems (Meyer, 1970).
(a) Sum Rule - If an 'event' D is expressed in 
terms of the mutually exclusive 'events' A,
B, and C as D = AU B Ü c then P (D) =
P(AUBUC) = P(A) + P(B) + P(C)
where P stands for the probability of the
'event' in the argument, and U represents 
or as used in set theory.
(b) Product Rule - If an event D is expressed 
in terms of the 'events' A, B, and C as
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D = A O b He then
P(D) = P(A AB n o  = P(A)P(B/A)P(C/A OB) 
where A stands for 'and'. The 'events' A, 
B, and C are not necessarily independent. 
The above approach is used in deriving the reliability models 
for specific components as presented in the next section.
c. Reliability Models of Basic Components 
Here, the reliability models of all the basic elements 
of an internal control system are developed. In the previous 
section I discussed two types of components: 'performance'
components and 'control' components. Both types of components 
are essential parts of any internal accounting control system.
In order to develop reliability models, it is very im­
portant that we understand the control process and the function 
of each of the system components for a given objective. The 
following discussion presents reliability models for the basic 
system components.
1. Performance Component 
As defined in the previous section, a performance com­
ponent should treat incoming information in a manner consistent 
with a given substantive objective. Performance components 
have no decision making capability and therefore their reli­
abilities are represented by single parameters. In this 
section, I derive and discuss the reliability models of per­
formance components for the following cases.
a. Performance Component with Single 
Input Information Channel 
An example of such a component is the process of pre­
paring a purchase order after receiving an approved purchase 
requisition. The input, in this example is the approved pur­
chase requisition, the process is the preparation of the pur-
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chase order and the output information is the completed pur­
chase order.
The relation between the reliabilities of the input 
and output information and the reliability of the performance 
component (A schematic representation of a performance compo­
nent will be given by the symbol □  ; see Fig. 1) is given by
input
•n
output
^i
IT
^o
Figure 1: Reliabilities in Relation
to a Performance Component.
the following proposition.
Proposition 1: The reliability, R^ , of output informa­
tion from a performance component is given in terms of the re­
liability, R^ , of the input information, the reliability, P, 
of the performance component, and the probability, p^^^, that 
the performance process offsets the input error, as:
= R^P + (1 - R^)(1 - P)PQff (il-1)
Proof: Consider the following 'events':
- The input information is correct.
Sp - The performance component completes its process 
properly.
Sggg - The error in the performance process offsets 
the error in the input information.
- The output information is correct.
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The correct state of the output information for a given 
control objective can be given in terms of the following re­
lation:
®o '  Sp* ^  *®i'’ S '*  ®of£*
where S. and S are opposite 'events' to that of S. and S ,a. p 1 p
respectively. The set theoretical notation is used for con­
junction. The above equation means that output information is 
correct if the input is correct and the performance component 
completes its process correctly, or if the input is incorrect 
and the performance component completes its process incorrectly 
and the error in the performance process offsets the error in 
the input.
Writing Eg.(II-2) in probability form by using the pro­
duct rule one obtains:
P(S^) - P(s^flSp) + P(s^n gpO s^„) .
P(S^)P(S/s^) + P(S^)P(S/Sj^)P(s^„/Spn S^ ) (11-3)
where P stands for the probability with which the 'event' in 
the argument occurs, P(Sp/S^) represents the conditional pro­
bability of 'events' given that 'event' occurs and 
p(S^££/S ns^) represents the conditional prob«Lbility of 
events given Sj^ and S^ . It is assumed here that is
independent of S^t i.e., the accurate application of the pro­
cess does not depend on the state of the input information.
In other words, the likelihood of proper performance is not 
dependent on whether input is correct. This independence
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between and leads Eq. (II-3) to:
P(S^) = P(S^)P(Sp) + P(S^)P(Sp)P(S^ff/S^nSp) (II-4)
or in terms of the symbols defined in Table J, one gets:
R = R.P + (1 - R.)(1 - P)P^__ (II-5)o r  1 orr
Q.E.D.
The first element of this result suggests that the re­
liability of the output information is further contaminated 
due to the errors committed in completing the task or procedure 
at the performance component. However, the second term in 
Eq.(II-5) represents an increase in reliability of the output 
information due to the offsetting effect of the error in the 
performance process. The probability, P^^gf that the error 
in the input is offset by the error in the performance process 
is usually so small that the net effect of the second term in 
Eq. (11-5) on R^ is neglegible. This offsetting, process wjll, 
not be considered in remaining cases because the reliability 
models would become too complex without much.added precision.
If the offsetting process is considered to be important in some 
individual case then the process can be easily incorporated 
in the model in the same manner as done in the present case.
For P=l,i.e.,when the performance component completes 
its procedure correctly in every input case, the reliability 
of the output is then simply equal to R^ . This is what one 
expects on an intuitive basis; the reliability of the output 
is equal to the reliability of the input if no further conta-
42
mination is added to the input information by a performance 
component.
In the case of a perfectly reliable input (Rj^ =l), the 
reliability, of the output is equal to the reliability 
parameter P of the performance component. Furthermore, for 
Rj^ =l, and P=l, one obtains R^=l which implies that when a 
performance component is 'perfect* and the input information 
is error free then the output contains no error. Again, these 
results are intuitively appealing.
b. Performance Component with Two Input Information 
Channels and no Redundancy 
Performance components with two input information 
channels with no redundancy are quite common in accounting 
systems. An example of such a component is a person who com­
putes the total cost of inventory received, based on quantity 
counts provided by one source and prices obtained from another 
source. In this case the two inputs are not redundant. A 
schematic representation of such a component is given in Fig­
ure 2.
*il
*i2
Ro
Figure 2 : A performance component with two
inputs and no redundancy.
In Fig. 2, R^ j^ , R^2 Rg,, respectively, represent the
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reliabilities of the two inputs and the output. The reliabi­
lity parameter of the performance component is given by Q (see 
Table I for definition). The reliability model of this 
component can be given in terms of the following proposition.
Proposition 2: The reliability of output informa­
tion from a performance component of reliability parameter Q 
is given by
Here, Q is assumed to be independent of and R^ g
i.e. the probability, Q of performing a procedure by the per­
formance component is independent of the state of the input 
o
information .
Proof ; Consider the following 'events' :
- The input information in channel one is correct.
®i2 ~ The input information in channel two is correct.
Sp - The performance component completes its process
properly.
Sq - The output information is correct.
The state, that the output information is correct for 
a given performance objective can be written in the following 
form (using set theoretical notations):
The above relation implies that the output information 
is correct when the two inputs are correct and the performance
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component is completing its process correctly.
Using the product rule and. writing Eg.- (II-7) in proba­
bility form one gets:
P(S^) » P(S^ j^)P(S^2/Sii>^<Sp/S^3^ n Cii-8)
PCSij/Sii) and P(Sp/S^j^n » respectively, represent the 
conditional probabilities of occurance of given and 
of Sp given and SLg* As discussed earlier, it can be as­
sumed that Su^ , 5^2 and Sp are mutually independent. Thus 
Eg. (II-8) becomes:
P(Sg) = P(S^]^)P(Sj^2)F(Sp) (II-9)
Rewriting this in terms of the symbols defined in 
Table I, one obtains:
R_ =  R . i  R,,0 t l I - 10)
o Q.E.D.
Eguation (11-10) suggests that if two pieces of informa­
tion are combined by a performance component to produce an out­
put, then the reliability of the output is the product of the 
three reliabilities. When Rj^j^= ^i2” then R^=Q. This means
that, in the case of error free inputs, the reliability of the 
output information is egual to the reliability parameter of the 
performance component.
When one of the channels provides error free informa­
tion (i.e. either R^ j^  « 1 or R^2 ' D  the performance com­
ponent is operating correctly all the time (Q - 1), then the 
reliability of the output information is egual to the reli-.. 
ability of the input information of the channel containing the
45
contaminated information. For example, if the information 
in channel one is error free (i.e. = 1) and 0 = 1  then
from Eq. (11-10) R^ equals R^g* This is what one expects in 
such cases.
c. Performance Component with n Parallel Input 
Channels and no Redundancy 
Here, a generalized reliability model of a performance 
component with n parallel input channels is developed. It is 
assumed that all the input inforamtion channels are non-redun- 
dant. The reliability of the output information from such a
component (see Fig.3.) is given by the following proposition:
Propostion 3: The reliability, R ,^ of the output in­
formation from a performance component with n input channels 
is equal to the product of all the reliabilities of the input 
information from the different channels and the reliability 
parameter of the component:
n
R = ÏÏ R44O (11-11)
o  II ij
j = 1
where R^j's and Q are defined in Table I.
i^l-
^i2
^in
Q Ro
Figure 3: A performance component with n input
non-redundant channels.
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Proof; Consider the following 'events':
®il ~ input information in channel one is correct. 
S^2 “ The input information in channel two is correct.
- The input information in channel n is correct.
Sp - The performance component completes it process
correctly.
- The output information is correct.
One can write the state, that the output information 
is correct for a given control objective, as follows:
So = SiiOSi2nSi3n. . (11-12)
This relation implies that the output information is 
correct only when all the inputs are correct and the performance 
component is functioning properly, i.e. it is completing its 
process correctly.
It should be clear that the 'events' S^ ,^ ®i2**'^in 
are mutually independent because they each represent the cor­
rect state of the input in the corresponding channel where each 
channel is independent of the other channel. Also, the 'event'
Sp that the performance component completes its process cor­
rectly, can be assumed to be independent of the states of the 
inputs with the same argument as the one presented in Sec.II.C.la. 
Thus, with the above assumptions, one Ccin rewrite Eq. (11-12) 
in terms of the probabilities of occurrence of the correspond-
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ing 'events' as follows:
P(S^) = P(S^3^)P(S^2).:.P(S^jP(Sp) (11-13)
In terms of the symbols defined in Table I, one can 
express thé above eguation as:
Pg ” ^il^i2* * **^in^ (II—14)
n
“o f Î /ijO (11-151
Q.E.D.
The above result is a general result for n parallel 
nonredundant channels where n can take any integer value. 
Special cases can be obtained by substituting different values 
for n. For instance, n = 1 and n = 2 give us the reliability 
results for single channel and two channels cases, respectively 
(see Egs. II -5 and II -10).
From Eq.(11-15), one finds that the reliability, 
of the output information decreases as the number of channels 
increases for all Rj^  ^1.0. This means that if an additional 
non-redundant information channel is used in completing a pro­
cess, the output is further contaminated due to the error in 
the additional information, even though the process was com­
pleted correctly.
2. Control Component 
A control component constitutes the most important 
element of a control system; when working properly it reduces 
the error of a particular kind in the output information. As 
discussed earlier control components, unlike the performance 
components, have decision making capabilities. This property 
makes the reliability modeling of control components more dif­
ficult. This difficulty increases with the increase in the 
number of parallel redundant information channels. The fol­
lowing discussion presents the different reliability models 
for different cases.
a. A Control Component with One Input. Information Channel
An example of a control component with one. input informa­
tion channel is a person approving a purchase requisition.
The input information is an unapproved requistion. In general, 
such an element will be characterized by three reliability
parameters: P , P and P (see Table I for definitions). Aw e e
schematic diagram of a control element will be represented by 
the symbol ^ (see Fig. 4).
input ____ > .-.y >. > output
Ri \  /  Ro
Figure 4: A control component with one input
channel.
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In Fig. 4, and represent the reliability of the 
input and the output information respectively, and vector P 
represents the reliability vector for the control component 
having P^ , P^ and P^ as the three components (see Table I for 
definitions). The following proposition presents the rela­
tionship between the different reliabilities mentioned in this 
case.
Propostion 4: The reliability R^ of output information
from a control component with reliability parameters: P^ , P^ 
and Pg is given by
"o = ’'i'l - * V w
for a given control objective. The reliability R^ applies to 
a particular control objective.
Proof : Consider the following 'events':
- The input information is correct.
- The control component is in operation.
Sg - The control component operates properly.
- The output information is correct.
The state of the output information depends on the state 
of the input information and the subsequent operation of the 
control élément. Thus using set notation, one can write 
in terms of the following mutually exclusive and exhaustive 
sets:
Sq  = ( S^n s^)u(Sj.D n  Sg)u(Sj^n s^) (ii-i?)
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The above equation çays that the output information 
is correct if the input is correct and the control is not in 
operation (inoperative failure) or the input is correct and 
the control is in operation and the control operates properly 
or the input is incorrect and the control is in operation and 
the control operates properly.
Writing Eq.(11-17) in probability form, one gets;
P(S^) = P(.S.)P(SJ + P(S.)P(S )P(S /s.n S )
o i w  i w c x w  (11-18)
+ P(s.)p(sjp(sys.nsj
Here, it is assumed that is independent of S^ , i.e. 
whether the control operates does not depend on the state of
Q
the input information . In other words, the control is as 
likely to function in an input error circumstance as in a no 
input error circumstance. It is also assumed that S^ , the 
proper functioning of a control depends on This assump­
tion implies that the two conditional probabilities: P(S^/S^n 
S^ ) and P(Sç/S^ns^), in general, will not be equal, i.e. P^ j^  
Pg (in terms of the syinbols defined in Table I). Although 
the above assumption (P^ / P^ ) is still subject to empirical 
test, it seems intuitively appealing. A control component, 
espcially a person, may not work with the same 'alertness' in 
the two circumstances (when the input is correct and when it 
is not correct).
In terms of the symbols defined in Table I, Eq.(11-18) 
becomes:
= R^d - P^ ) + R.P^Pç + (1 - Ri)P^Pg (11-19)
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Rearranging this equation, one gets;
+ Pw'Pc - '■e’l + V e
It is interesting to note that the last two terms:
+ (1 - Rj^ )P^ Pg in Eq. (11-19) represent the conditional
probability of satisfactory control performance. This would
be useful information to the management. A further discussion 
is presented in Chapter IV.
Special Cases:
(i) Assume: P^ = 0 i.e. the control is never in:operation.
This condition yields:
Rq = R^ (11-21)
which means that the reliability of the output information is 
the same as that of the input information. This is what one 
would expect if the control never works or is not installed, 
(ii) Assume a perfect control component i.e. P^ = P^ = P^
= 1. This gives:
Rq = 1 (11-22)
This again is an intuitively expected result because 
when the control is perfect the reliability of the output in­
formation should always be unity irrespective of the state of 
the input information.
(iii) Assume : = 1, P^ = 0 i.e. the component is always
in operation and has no corrective capability. The 
reliability of the output information, in this case 
becomes:
52
= R.Pc (11-23)
This result implies that the input information is further con­
taminated by the control component making incorrect decisions 
when the input is correct.
It will be shown in Chapter IV, through sensitivity ana­
lysis, that the relative importance of and P^ changes as the
reliability of the input information changes. When R/>0.5, P^ 
is more important than P^ but when R^<O.S, P^ becomes more im­
portant than P^ . This result has important implications in 
personnel training programs (see Chapter IV for further details)
b. Control Component with Two Input Information 
Channels (One Being Redundant)
A reliability model of a control component with two 
input information channels with one being redundant is derived
here. The control element receives two inputs and performs an
'operation' (attempted prevention, detection and/or correction 
of an error in the input) and produces an output. In fact it 
may produce several identical outputs to be sent to different 
sources. An example of such a component is a voucher clerk in 
an inventory control system where the clerk determines the cor­
rect quantity of items for which payment should be made, by com­
paring two independent pieces of input information:(1) the quan­
tity received as reported on the receiving report, and (2) the 
quantity shipped by the vendor as shown on the vendor's invoice.
There are several operations performed on the input
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information by the control element depending on the state of 
the input. The schematic representation of such an element 
is shown in Fig. 5.
The reliability vector Q in Fig. 5 represents the re­
liability parameters of the control component. It has, in 
general, four components : Q^ , Q ,^ and where 0^^ is
assumed to be independent of the channel containing error, 
i.e. is constant regardless of which input channel contains 
erroneous data. The reliability model for this component is 
presented through the following proposition.
Proposition 5; The reliability, R^ , of the output in­
formation for a given control objective is given by the follow­
ing relation;
■*0 = * Ow<°c - + 02e'l
+ <*U + *i2>0w'°le - °2e' +
where Q^, Q^ , 0^^ and 0^^ represent the reliability parameters 
of the control component as discussed above, and and R^j
are the reliabilities of the two inputs.
Proof: Consider the following 'events':
- The input information in channel one is correct.
Sj^ 2 ” The input information in channel two is correct.
- The control component is in operation.
Sg - The control component operates properly.
- The output information is correct.
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12
Figure 5: a control component with two inputs
with one being redundant
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The state of the output information can be written in 
terms of the states of the input information and the control 
component as follows:
So = (S^n s^)D(s^^n s„n s^n s^)
"(s^^ns^^n s„nSo)0(s^j^n V  (n-25)
The combination of states in each parenthesis in 
Eg.(11-25) are mutually exclusive and thus the equation cam 
be written in terms, of the correspondihg probabilities as:
P(So> = P<Sii)P(Si2/S^i)P(S„)
+ p(s^^)p(s^j/s^j^)p(s^)p(So/s.^n '' ®W>
+ P(Sii)P(s.2/s.^)p(s„)P(So / Sij/>Sijns„)
+ P(s.^)P(s^j/s^^)p<s„)p(So/s^j^n S^J n s„)
+ P (S^ l^ P (Sig/Sil)p (S;,)P (Sg/Sii n S^2 " V  ("-2GI
where (but not S^ ) is assumed to be independent of the 
states of the input.
This result is general and can be applied to any 
control component with two input channels. In the above equa­
tion the 'events' and S^2 ere not assumed to be independent. 
In fact, one event may depend on the other but not vice versa. 
For example the correct state of a purchase order would not 
depend on the correctness of the corresponding vendor's invoice. 
However, the correctness of a vendor's invoice may depend on 
the correctness of the corresponding purchase order.-
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In the present derivation of the model, it is assumed, 
for simplicity that two 'events* and S^2 ^re independent of 
each other. As an example, consider a payroll system where 
one channel contains the number of hours worked by each em­
ployee based on the time cards and the other channel contains 
number of hours worked based on job cards. The two pieces of 
information are independent and are compared for control pur­
poses. The present model is suited to this situation.
By assuming independence of inputs, one can write 
Eq. (11-26) in the following form using the parameters defined 
in Table I:
"o = - °w> + + (1 -
+ R-ill - Ri2)Q„0le + (1 - - «i2»V2e
Rearranging, one obtains:
= «il«i2&  - «W * a„<0o - :Ole + °2e>3
+ («il +«i2>0«((ïle - Q2e* + Ow°2e ("-Z»)
Q.E.D.
Special Cases:
(i) Assume a perfect control component, i.e. Q^ = 
0^ = Q^g = Qjg = 1. Then the reliability of the output infor­
mation becomes:
Rq = 1 (11-29)
This result implies that the output is always correct when the
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control is perfect,
(.ii) Assme; = Qq " ®le ^ = 0,
This means that the control is always in operation and 
the control element always works properly when either or both 
inputs are correct, but that the control never works properly 
if both the inputs are incorrect. This condition yields (by 
substitution in Eq.11-24);
"o = ■'il + "12 - ■'il"i2 "1-301
This is the traditional result (Bodnar 1975 and Barett, Baker, 
and Richett 1977) advanced without explication of the limiting 
assumptions, i.e. 0 ^ = 0 ^ =  = 1, and = 0.
c. Control Component with n Parallel Independent 
Input Information Channels (n - 1 
Channels Being Redundant)
A reliability model of a control component with n paral­
lel independent input information channels with n-1 channels 
being redundant, as a general case, is developed here. This 
model will yield reliability results for special cases, e.g. 
two channels, three channels and so on when n=2, 3 and etc..
There are several situations in accounting systems where 
we have components with n>2. t'or example, in a voucher system, 
a clerk reviewing voucher data for the correct 'nature’ of the 
material requires three inputs:(1) a bill of lading, (2) a receiv­
ing report and (3) an inspection report. He prepares a voucher only 
after finding all the information is in agreement. In the case of
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a discrepancy, the voucher clerk should try to find it and 
correct it before completing the voucher.
The schematic representation of a control element with 
n input information sources is presented in Fig. 6. Here, all 
the input channels are assumed to be independent and have dif­
ferent reliabilities. The assumption regarding the channels
11—
12-
R.i,n-l
i,n
Figure 6: A control component with n input channels;
n-1 channels being redundant.
being independent can be easily relaxed by redefining the relia­
bility parameters in terms of the conditional probabilities as 
discussed in Sec.C.l.b of this chapter.
The reliability model of the control component under 
consideration is given in terms of the following proposition.
Proposition 6; The reliability, R^ , of the output in­
formation can be written in terms of the reliabilities of the 
input channels and the reliability parameters of the control 
element as:
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■'o = - V  +
n n
' # 1
1%
' A  è «  ''"ik' '^ -" « > i  W 3 e
m^k
+ •
+ F  (1 - %ij)OwGne 
3=1
(11-31)
where Z  stands for the summation and 7T for the product. The 
different reliability symbols are defined in Table I.
Proof ; Consider the following 'events';
511 - The input information in channel one is correct.
512 - The input information in channel two is correct.
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- The input information in channel n is correct.
- The control component is in operation.
- The control component operates properly.
- The output information is correct.
The output information will be correct in the following 
(n+2) state combinations: 1) all the input information from 
different channels are correct and the control element is not 
in operation, 2) all the inputs are correct, the control is 
in operation and it operates properly, 3) all the inputs ex­
cept one are correct, the control is in operation and it op­
erates properly, 4) all the inputs except two are correct, 
the control is in operation and it operates properly.... n+2) 
all n inputs are incorrect but the control is in operation 
and it operates properly. This statement can be written in 
terms of the 'events' defined above as:
n _ n
u( u  n ( n  o s „ n s j )  
j^k
k=l ik . ij' w o'
n
u(( n S. .) ns^ns^) (11-32)j_l w c
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n n
where S^j stands for ^  ^®in j=i i^j
stands for S^gA... A Using the property of
mutually exclusive events or combination of events, and the 
product rule, one can write Eg. (11-32) in terms of the re­
spective probabilities of occurance of the corresponding events, 
in the following form:
P(S„) = n^p(s..)P(s„) +
jj^ k e
xp(s/s n s . ^ A ( n  Si„ns„0
m=l 
m^i ,k
+ ÏÏ^P(S^j)P(S„)P(S„/S„n Ji,) (11-33)
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In the above equation it is assumed that the state 
of the input information from each channel is independent of 
the state of the input information from the other channels. 
Equation(11-33) yields Eq.(11-31) when the reliability symbols 
defined in Table I are used instead of the probabilities sym­
bols given in Eq.(11-33). Q.E.D.
The reliability model in Eq.(11-31) is for a general 
case. Specific models can be obtained by selecting a value 
for n. For example, if n = 1, the reliability result in Eq.- 
(11-31) reduces to;
- °w' + « i l V c  + <1 - "il’V i e
which is equivalent to Eq.(11-19), the reliability model for 
a control component with one input channel.
Similarly, for n = 2, Eq.(11-31) reduces to
®o = "il‘*i2'l - + "il^ilVc
+ [(1 -
+ <1 - «ilXl - Ri2>V2e '11-35)
This result is identical to the result derived in Sec.II.C.2.b. 
Special Case:
For ” •••“ ^ the input channels,
have the same reliability and for =••• Qjie “ ®e' ^he
reliability R^ of the output information becomes (Eq.11-31):
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Rq = r"(1 - 0«) + r"OwOj. + [n(l - R)e”*^
+ (1-R) + n;nri^ - 2 1(]^ _g,3,n-3
or
"o = - ÛW 0„<Qc- Oe>] + [k + (1-R)]” Q„Q,
This result reduces to:
*0 = r" [ i - + Q^(Qc - Oe)] + QwQe (H-36)
Here again for = 1,i.e, for a perfect con­
trol component with n input channels, the reliability, be­
comes unity, as expected.
3. Parallel Inputs Merged with no Redundancy 
and no Component at the Junction 
The reliability model developed here deals with a sys­
tem of parallel inputs merged with no redundancy and no compo­
nent at the junction. A payroll system in a company with sever­
al departments is a good example of such a system. The payroll 
office receives similar payroll information (Number of employ­
ees, their wage rates, number of hours worked, etc.) from 
each department. All these inputs from different departments 
work like a single input for the payroll office. The schemat­
ic diagram for such a merger is given in Fig. 7.
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^1'  *“
^2’ *2
Figure 7: Merger of similar information
Where and R^  are the reliabilities of items within two in­
put data sets, R is the reliability of the combined information 
and n^  ^and n^ stand for the amount of data from the two channels, 
respectively. The reliability model for the combined informa­
tion of this kind has been discussed by Yu and Neter (1973), 
and the reliability is given by the weighted average of the 
reliabilities:
= (n^R^ + "2) (11-36)
The result can be easily generalized for more than two channels. 
But it is not considered here because it does not add new in­
sight to the model.
CHAPTER III
RELIABILITY MODELS OF COMPLEX SYSTEMS OR SUBSYSTEMS
This chapter discusses methods of combining the relia­
bility models of the basic components (discussed in Chapter II) 
to develop models of complex systems or subsystems. To make 
the problem simpler, I will consider only one type of control 
objective. Generalization to multiple control objectives is 
possible provided one keeps in mind that a change in the con­
trol objective may change the structure of the system and hence 
the reliability model. One simply needs to multiply the indivi­
dual reliabilities for different control objectives to obtain 
an overall reliability (see Cushing 1974) .
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first 
section discusses models of systems having components in series. 
The second part deals with models of systems with components 
in parallel. The third section is devoted to systems which 
have components in 'dual'.
A. Components in Series
1. Performance Components in Series 
Consider a system of n performance components connected 
in series. The schematic diagram of such a system is given 
in Fig. 8.
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o3ol o2 on
Figure 8; Performance components in series.
The symbols in Fig. 8 representing different reliabi­
lities are defined in Table I. The following proposition pre­
sents the reliability for such a system.
Proposition 7 ; The reliability of output inform- 
tion after it has passed though n performance components is 
given by
n
•on = ■R -  = R i l T  P j (III-l)
j=l
where is the reliability of the input information to the 
first component.
Proof; Using Eq. (II-l), one can write the reliability 
of the output information from the first component as
RqI = (III-2)
considering this information as input for the second element 
we can write
^o2 ^01^2 ^i^l^2
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Continuing this process of considering the output from the 
previous component as the input for the next component up to 
n components, one obtains;
*on = V iV b-” ''»
or
R o n  -  Tf" P j
Q.E.D.
Since all P^'s and are less than unity, the relia­
bility of the final output information, R^^ decreases as n 
(the number of performance components) increases. This result 
is similar to the reliability of an electronic device with n 
components in series. As the number of components increases, 
the reliability of the device decreases.
An example of such a system is a payroll system with 
no 'control' components. This is illustrated in Fig. 9 by di­
viding the job processes into different performance elements. 
Here, the first element receives the information on different 
clock cards and sorts, thenj by eipployee number. The next 
element calculates the hours worked by each employee. This 
information is then used by the 3rd component to calculate 
the grand total of hours worked, and so on until in the last 
component payroll checks are prepared for the employees. In 
this system, error can be introduced at each step of the 
process, i.e., at each component. If one component fails 
to operate, the whole system fails. For example, if the 
element calculating the total hours worked per employee.
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employee 
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pay
Calculate 
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total hours 
of all 
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Prepare
payroll
checks
Figure 9: a payroll system with no control component.
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computes the hours worked incorrectly, then the information 
flowing through the system beyond that element is always in 
error,
2. Control Components in Series 
Here, I want to discuss the reliability model of a con­
trol system or subsystem which consists of control components 
in series (see Figure 10).
Figure 10: Control components in series.
The reliability model for this system can be given by the follow­
ing propostion.
Proposition 8: The reliability of the final output 
information after it has passed through n control components 
is given by ^-1 n
where
Xj = 1 - P^j + P^j(Pgj - Pgj); j = lr2...n (III-7)
Yj = PgjP^j ; j * 1,2...n (III-8)
Proof: Using the reliability model of a single control
component one can write R^^ as
or
"ol ” "l*l * ^ 1 (III-IO)
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where x^and are defined in Eqs. (III-7) and (III-8).
Considering the output of the first component as the 
input for the second one, one can write the reliability of out­
put information from the second component as
% 2  = + y 2 (III-ll)
Using the result of Eq. (III-IO), one can write
% 2  ” * ^1^2 + ^2 (III-12)
Iterating this procedure n times, one obtains:
n-1 . n
*on = R. 7T X. + 2: (y.f TT xA1+ y (Iil-13)ij=l ] j=lL^Vk=j+l /J "
0 * E .D «
Special Case;
^wj = w^' Pci= ^c Pei= ^e V ^  then
Xj = X V j 
Yj = y V i
This implies that with regard to reliability, all the components
are identical. For this case R reduces to:on
"'on = V "  + y
where
and
X = 1 - + P^(P^ - P^ ) (IIX-15)
y = PgP* (III-16)
Equation (III-14) provides interesting results that are dis­
cussed below.
71
It can be shownthat x must fall in the range;
-1^ X ^ 1. For -K.X <1, as n->co , x^ -» 0 therefore reduces 
to:
^oco= Pe/(1 - ^c + (III-17)
This result suggests that even after infinitely many
controls in a series, the output is not error free if 1,
i.e., if the controls have the potential to falsely signal
error when the input is correct. It is interesting to note
that as n-»t>o, R becomes insensitive to P, and for P = 1, on w c
R ^ ^  1 for any value of P^ . This suggests that as the number 
of controls in a series increases, it becomes far less impor­
tant for a control component to operate than for a control to be 
designed so that when it does operate it avoids the potential 
of falsely signaling an error. The result is in accordance
with intuition and "common sense" as opposed to Bodnar's
11result (Bodnar 1975). The graphs presented in Figs. 11 - 13 
elaborate the above results. For example, one can see from 
Fig. 11 that when P^= 1 and P^, = 1, i.e., when the control is 
in operation and it can not falsely signal error, the reliabi­
lity, R^^, of the output information increases rapidly as n, 
the number of control components in the series increases, and 
it approaches unity for large n. The graph also indicates that 
Rqjj approaches unity more quickly for larger P^ .
When Pg^l, two situations are of interest: one where
P S P  and the other where P >P . In the former case if we as- c ' e e c
sume P^^l, then x becomes positive and R^^ varies monotonically 
with n. For certain values of P^ , it decreases with increasing
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Figure 11: Variation of the reliability of the output
information with the number of control components in 
series for Rj^ =O.B, Pv=1.0, Pc=1.0 and for different 
values of Pg. All the components are assumed to be 
identical in terms of their reliability parameters.
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ent values of Pg (0.0 to 0.4). All the components are 
identical in terms of their reliability parameters.
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Figure 13: Variation of Rq »^ the reliability of the output
information with the number of control components in 
series for Ri=0.8, Pv=1.0, Pq*0.9 and for different 
values of P@. All the components are identical in 
terms of their reliability parameters.
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n and. for others it increases with n (see Figures 12 and 13). 
These results are important for control design purposes. A 
control system will be dysfunctional if the final reliability 
of the output information decreases with the increase in the 
number of control components in series. If such is the case, 
management should provide proper training and/or replace 
personnel to improve the reliability parameters and so 
that increases with increasing n as in Fig. 13. However, 
it should be clear from Fig. 13 that for Pg<l, never reaches 
unity for any n regardless of P^ . But when P^ = 1, R^^ ap­
proaches unity (see Fig. 11) for any value of P^ as n is in­
creased. This clearly shows the importance of P^ over P^ in 
improving the reliability of a control system. The value of 
«X, required to drive R^^ to unity, increases as P^ decreases.
When x<0, i.e. for P^=l and as plotted in Fig. 14
'oscillates' with increasing n for some values of P^ . The 'osc­
illation' never attenuates for Pg= 0 and P@ = 1, and R^^ takes 
values 1 - R^ and R^ alternately as n changes. The physical 
reasoning for this result is that if a control operates in 
such a manner that it contaminates 100% of the correct input 
and corrects 100% of the incorrect inputs then the reliability 
of the output information from such an element would be 1 - R^
where R^ is the reliability of the input information. The con-
12trol elements are functional . (R^ "^^  R f^ for P^^ 1 -
(1 - R^ )P^ /Rj^ , although R^^ reaches a saturation limit very 
rapidly as n is increased (see Fig. 14). This limit is not
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Figure 14: Variation of Ron' the reliability of the output
information with the number of control components in 
series for Ri=0.8, P„=1.0, P@=1.0 and for different 
values of P . All the components are identical in 
terms of their reliability parameters.
77
usually unity unless = 1.
When Pg = 1 and P^ = Or i.e., the control elements do 
not contaminate correct inputs and at the same time do not 
correct any input errors, then for all n. This
result makes sense, because the control is neither introducing 
error nor correcting error that may exist in the input. Thus, 
the reliability of the output remains unchanged as the infor­
mation flows through such a system.
3. Performance and Control Components in Series 
This section deals with reliability models for systems 
containing a mixture of performance and control components 
connected in series. There are several examples of such sys­
tems in real cases (Arens and Loebbecke, 1980). An example, 
part of a payroll system, is presented in Figure 15.
ol o3o2
' Foreman's 
Approval
Dept. X
Time card 
punching
Payroll
clerk A
Time card
Çrocess- ng
Figure 15: Payroll subsystem.
The reliability model for any particular control objec­
tive in such a system can be easily obtained from the gener­
al result derived in Sec. III.A.2. (Eq. III-6) by setting P^^'s 
equal to zeros and P^^'s = 1 for those components (jth element) 
which behave as performance components.
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As an example of the above approach,consider the sub­
system in Fig. 15. The first and third components are 'per­
formance' components and the second one is a control component. 
Thus setting n = 3, = P^ , P^^ = P^^ ” 0/ P^^ = P  ^and
P^ g^  = P^g = 1, one obtains the following reliability model 
for the subsystem;
«03 = [«I'l - «„2> + V w 2«c2 + '1 - PllP«2«e2]P3"::-:°'
This result can also be derived using the basic approach 
of combining reliabilities of different components by consider­
ing the output of one component as an input to the other; Using 
this approach one gets
= P^ (III-21)
«02 = «ol'l - ««2'+ «ol«w2«o2 - «ol>«w2«e2
and
«03 = «o2«3 mi-22b)
Combining the above equations one obtains the result of Eq. 
(III-20). This model is further discussed in Chapter IV.
B. Components in Parallel 
This section is devoted to the discussion of reliabili­
ty models of systems with redundant parallel components. The 
general case and one special case of control components in par­
allel with n elements in one channel and m elements in the 
other with a control component at the junction (see Fig. 16) 
are discussed first. This is followed by a discussion of.the 
general case and one special case of performance components 
in parallel preceding a control element.
Figure 16; Control components in parallel with 
a control component at the junction 
and one channel being redundant.
1. Control Components in Parallel 
The reliability model for a system of control components 
connected in parallel as shown in Fig. 16 can be easily ob­
tained by using the results derived earlier in Eqs. (11-24) and 
(III-6). The result is:
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I
<^0 = V o m  - 0» + Ow'Oc - + °2e'^
+ '"on + O “w'0le ■ °2e> + °2e°w (m-23)
I
^on ^om given by the following equations (using Eq. 
III-6):
n-1
m m-1 . m
om , „ , . . .
where
^ - Pw] + ^W] (^ ci ■ Pej): j = 1. 2 ....n (in-26)
~  ^ej^wj
Xf = 1 - Pwf ■ è^e ) ' 1, 2, . m (III-27)
and
y; = ^eiKt (III-28)
Special Case;
In order to interpret some of the results obtained here, 
let us assume that all of the control components are identical 
in terms of their reliability parameters, except the one at 
the junction; i.e. Xj = x  ^ = x; y^  = y^' = y for all^ and j.
This reduces Eqs.(III-24) and (III-25) to (see Eq. III-14);
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n
"on = "il"" +
and
"om = "i2"" + y r W -  <111-30 )
It has been demonstrated in Sec. III.A.2. that relia­
bility of the output information can be improved significantly 
by selecting proper control components (see Fig. 11) and in­
creasing the number of control components in series. However 
when this highly reliable information is combined by the con­
trol component at the junction in Fig. 16, the output may not 
be as reliable as the inputs because of the possibility of 
substantive contamination being created and/or introduced at 
the junction.
Consider the following example to illustrate the above 
point. Let = 0.99, = 0.98, = If 0^ = 0.95, = 0.9,
and Ogg = 0.85. This yields:
01^ = 0.9485 (III-31)
This result is definitely below the reliability of 
either of the inputs. Therefore the parallel combination of 
two channels of control connected in series (Fig. 16) may seem 
to be an undesirable combination if the control element at the 
junction is not highly reliable. However, one should keep in 
mind at this stage that the presence of a control component at 
the junction may control the behavior of the two elements in 
the two channels, and therefore eliminating the control at the 
junction may create an environment where the two elements may
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not perform with the same high reliability.
For example, in a payroll system of a manufacturing 
firm, a control component, determining the 'correct' total 
hours worked by employees, compares two inputs: 1) the total 
hours worked by employees according to the employee cards 
and 2). the total hours worked according to the job cards.
Since it is known that the two data sources are compared, the 
personnel responsible for each, input component would be care­
ful not to introduce any error. This may be due to the fear 
that an error may be caught by the control element and 
attributed to the related data source. On the other hand, if 
there is no control, i.e. only one of the data channels is 
available and no control is built to verify that number, then 
the source generating the data need not fear such attribution. 
Thua the presence of a control component in this example 
motivates the two data generating sources to produce highly 
reliable data.
2, Performance Components in Parallel 
Preceding a Control Coitgonent 
The general schematic diagram for a system with redund­
ant performance conqponents in parallel preceding a control is 
given in Fig. 17.
'il
'i2
P' Pi pi1
^^ ol
2
rIo ^3
P'm R*
Figure 17: Performance components in parallel with
a control component at the junction.
The reliability logic for this system can be obtained direct-
I
ly from L'q. (III-23) by simply substituting P^j * ■ 0, ■
P^k * If Pgj “ Pj and Pg^ « Pk for j * 1 , 2,...n and k = 1,2,.
..m. The substituiton of . Pg's « 0 implies that performance 
components do not have error correcting capability and P^*s«
1 implies that performance components are always in operation 
while their respective processes are being completed. If a 
performance component of a control system fails to operate, 
the system will collapse i.e. information will not flow through 
the system unless the performance components are in operation.
Using the above substitutions in Eg.(111-23), one ob­
tains the following result for the reliability of the output 
information from the system shown in Fig. 17:
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I
« 6  = V o m  11 - Q, + °w<°c - lOle + Oj,)]
+ (%n + «J«w'Ole - °2e> + °2e«« « 11-“ '
where_ ^
®on ' *ii « 11-“ '
and
C  - \ 2  Jl, \  « 11-“ '
Special Case:
Consider Pj = Pj^ = P V j and k, i.e., all the per­
formance components are identical in terms of reliability 
parameters. This reduces Eq. (11-32) to:
- '<il'>i2l’”''” 'l - ®w ♦ «w'Oc - lOle + "2."
+ «"ll^ + «i2^ ' 0w(%= - 02e' * G2eOw « « - “ '
This result is important. It demonstrates that the 
reliability of output information from a series of performance 
components can be improved significantly if a redundant par­
allel channel is created and the results of the two channels 
are compared. In case of a discrepancy, the discrepancy is 
searched out and the error is corrected. This point is illus­
trated in the following example.
Example : Assume P = 0.9, n = 8, m = 4, “ 0.8,
= 1, 0^ = .92, = 0.90, Ogg = 0.85. From Eqs. (III-33)-
(III-35) one gets:
R = 0.3444 (III-36)
on
r ' - 0.52488 (III-37)om
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and
= 0.861o (III-38)
In this case the output reliability was increased. The relia­
bility, of the information after it has gone through the 
control component at the junction (see Fig. 17) is higher than
R and R' , which are the reliabilities of the information on om
coming out of the two channels. But the improvement in relia­
bility depends on the values of the reliability parameters of 
the control component. In certain situations, their Q values 
may be so low that it may further reduce the reliability of 
the output information by introducing and/or creating errors.
. C. 'Dual' Elements in Series 
Here, the reliability model of a control system with 
control components connected in 'dual' is considered. A 
schematic representation of the system is given in Fig. 18.
on
Figure. 18: A series of 'dual' control elements.
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The reliability of the output information from this 
system can be obtained by considering the reliability model of 
an individual 'dual' element. Consider a jth 'dual' element 
(Fig. 19) which consists of two control elements in parallel 
and one control element at the junction.
03
o]o]
Figure 19: jth 'dual' element consisting of control
components,
An example of such an element is a price control sys­
tem where a control component (a person) in one channel checks 
the price of an item against a catalog price and the other re­
dundant control component, a computer, compares the input price 
with its stored information on prices. These two parallel (one 
being redundant) pieces of price information go to a third con­
trol component (e.g., a supervisor or a programmed computer 
edit check), This component compares the two pieces of infor­
mation and makes a decision. The output, in this case is the 
final price of the item.
The reliability of the input information to the 'dual' 
element in Fig. 19 is j - 1 which is the reliability of
the output from the (j - l)th 'dual' element. From Eq.(11-28)
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one can write the reliability of the output from the jth 
'dual' element as :
^oj = + «"cj *
where
%i = 1 - Q«j + «wj'OcJ - 20lei + °2ej>
’'j = - «2ej>
Zj = Owjfi2ej (III-42)
I
and, R j^ and are given by (Eq. 11-16):
"*oj ~ (III-44)
where
%i = 1 - + P«j(Pci - Pei' ("1-45'
yj = PejPwj ("I-4G'
One can iterate this procedure, starting from j = 1 
to j = n to obtain ^  as,shown in Fig. 18. For the first
dual element in Fig. 18, one obtains;
K i  ‘ * n
(%el = "olPiA 4- (Pol + (III-47)
For the second element;
®o2 ' *01*2 * ^2
*02 = *01*2 + y'2
(%o2 = *02*02*2 + (*02 + 4. Zj (III-48)
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on
ol o2 on
Figure 20: n 'dual' elements in series. Each 'dual' 
element contains two performance components 
in parallel and one control component at 
the junction.
on
bl b2 on
b2 on
Figure 21: n 'dual' elements in series. Each 'dual' 
element contains two control components 
in parallel and a performance component 
at the junction.
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Similarly, one can write the reliability of the output infor­
mation from the nth 'dual' element as:
- + «on + »'in>*n + 'n
where
. "on ■ n-l*n * »n 
"in" ^ o n - l K * K
Equation (III-49) represents a general result. A 
special case where all the control components in 'dual* re­
dundant channels are identical and all the control components 
at the junction are identical in terms of their reliability 
parameters, can be studied by appropriately selecting values 
for the reliability parameters in Eg. (III-49).
Here all the elements are control elements and the re­
liability of the output information may increase or even de­
crease with the increase in the number of 'dual' elements in 
series. For exanqple, when the control elements are in opera­
tion all the time (i.e. » 1) and they correctly perform
their operation when the input(s) are correct (i.e. " 0^ =
1); but Pg » 0.4 and ■0,0, then the reliability
of the output information decreases rapidly to zero as 
the number of 'dual' elements increases. This effect can be 
seen in the graph in Fig. 22. But when the parameter 
( = Qgg) is improved slightly, i.e., » Qjg = 0.2,
will increase with increasing n (see curve 2 in Fig. 22).
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When the parameters P »^ and Ogg are increased together 
then (^on increases very rapidly and approaches
unity as n increases (see curves 4 and 5 in Fig. 22). It is 
interesting to note that when 1 and never ap­
proaches unity for any n, P^ , 0^^ and (see the graphs in 
Fig. 23). This result suggests that in order for to
approach unity, one must improve the parameters P^ and i.e. 
improve the correct judgment process when the inputs are cor­
rect rather than adding more 'dual' elements to the system
without improving P and Q . These results are important forc c
control system design purposes. Because the general notion 
that adding more controls would increase the output reliability 
is not necessarily true. Also adding new controls to increase 
the output reliability may be costlier than improving the re­
liability parameters P^ and of the existing control compo­
nents through such steps as providing additional job training.
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1. 'Dual' Performance Elements in Series with 
Control Components at the Junctions 
The reliability model of a system consisting of n 
'dual' performance elements in series with control components 
at the junctions (see Fig. 20) is discussed here. The relia­
bility results for this system can be obtained directly from 
the results developed in the previous case (Eqs. III-39 - 
III-50) by substituting = P^  ^= 0, P^ j = = 1, P^j = Pj
I f
and P . = P. for all j where j = 1, 2,... n (see the discus^ c J 3
sion in Sec. III.B.2 for the logic in support of this approach) 
This procedure yields the reliability, of the output in­
formation from the nth 'dual' element of the system (using 
Eqs. III-49 and III-50) as;
t
where
« on = V o n ^ n  + <«on + ^on'^n
1 - V   ^Own'Ocn ' Z^lon + °2en>
^n = V'Olen ’ «Zen»
^n = °wn02en 
"on = « o n - A  
V  = «on-1'’A
The above symbols are defined in Table I (see also Fig. 20).
A computer program (see Appendix B) was written to study 
the variation of the output reliability, with the number 
(n) of 'dual' elements in the system (see Fig. 20). Figure
94
24 shows this variation for different values of the reli­
ability parameters of the components under the assumption 
that all the control components are identical and that the 
performance components of the system are also identical to 
each other (i.e. Pj = Pj = P and Q^j = Qc» Qiej = Qie»
°2ej = Q2e Î)'
It is observed from Fig. 24 that as the probabilities
and increase, the output reliability increases for a 
given number of 'dual' elements in the system. It is also 
observed that for smaller values of 0^^ and Qge' ^on decreases 
with increasing n (see curves 1-3 in Fig. 24) reaching a lower 
limit. This is an undesirable feature of a control system, as 
one would like the output reliability to increase as the
number of controls are increased. However, when and 
are large, the output reliability, increases rapidly with 
increasing n, reaching an upper limit (see curves 4-6 in Fig. 
24). It is interesting to note that the upper limit of 
never approaches unity for P<1 and Qg<l (see curves 1-4 in 
Fig. 24). However, when P = 1 and = 1, the upper limit 
becomes unity. This result implies that a high reliability in 
the output information can be acheived by increasing the number 
of dual elements in series, only when the correct input informa­
tion is not further contaminated. In this case (i.e. when 
P = 1, and = 1), the output reliability, approaches
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unity very quickly as the number of dual elements increases 
(see curves 5 and 6 in Fig. 24).
2. 'Dual' Control Elements in Series with Performance 
Components at the Junction 
This subsection is devoted to the development and dis­
cussion of a reliability model of a system consisting of 'dual' 
control elements in series with performance components at the 
junctions. A schematic representation of such a system is 
given in Fig. 21. The reliability results for this system can 
be obtained directly from Eqs.(III-39)-(III-50) by substituting 
Qlej = Qgej = 1 and = Q for all j where j = 1,
2,... n (see the discussion in Sec.III.B.2 for the logic in 
support of this approach). Thus, one obtains from Eq. (III-49), 
the output reliability from the nth element as:
« o n  = V o A « n
where
^on
and
“ &on-l I: - * ‘
^oA = «on-1 II - - PeA'I + '■An'’™
The different symbols used above are defined in Table I (see 
also Fig. 21).
A computer program (see Appendix B) was used to compute 
values for the output reliability for different values
of n, Pg, and P^ . The results were plotted in Fig. 25 against 
n. It was assumed in the above computation that all the con-
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trol components of the system are identical to each other, 
similarly all the performance components are identical to each 
other (i.e. • P^: P,j - P^J = P ;^ P^j - P^ J - P,
and Oj = 0 for all j).
It is observed that for = 0.9 and for smallerc
values of P^ , the output reliability, initially decreases
rapidly with an increase in the number of 'dual* elements in 
the system. However, it fairly quickly approaches a lower 
limit as n increases further (see curves 1 and 2 in Fig. 25). 
But for larger values of and for P^ = 1.0, 01^^ increases 
with increasing n reaching an upper limit. The upper limit 
depends on Q (see Eq. III-57). As the likelihood of correctly 
completing performance tasks by the performance components at 
the junctions increases, the output reliability increases.
An important implication of the above findings is that 
when a control system is designed as depicted in Fig. 21, the 
output reliability cannot be increased to unity by just 
adding more 'dual' elements. In fact the additional gain in 
the output reliability by increasing n may not be significant, 
if it (^ Qjj) has already approached the upper limit (see curves 
3 and 4 in Fig. 25). Also in certain cases where the relia­
bility parameters of the system are not high enough, the output 
reliability decreases with increasing n. Thus the increase 
in n, in this case, is dysfunctional (see curves 1 and 2 in 
Fig. 25).
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Figure 25: Variation o f w i t h  n, where n represents the
number of identical dual control elements in series 
with performance components at tne junctions (Fig. 21} 
for P^ = 1.0 and Q = 0.95.
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Chapter III has provided reliability models of 
complex forms of internal control systems. It has also 
analyzed the effects on output reliability of input reliabil­
ity parameters and of the different control parameters. The 
effects of increasing the number of control components in a 
system with -various configurations were also discussed. Sev­
eral limiting cases were considered. These results provide 
intuitive support for the models. A field study conducted to 
validate some of the models is presented in Chapter V.
CHAPTER IV
SENSITIVITY AND COMPARATIVE STRUCTURAL ANALYSES
This chapter presents the results of sensitivity anal­
ysis and structural analysis of certain control systems (or 
subsystems).. The detailed procedures for the analyses are 
also discussed here. The results of sensitivity analysis 
provide information regarding the relative sensitivity of the 
output reliability in terms of the other reliability para­
meters. These results and the related procedures are pre­
sented below in Section A. The results of structural analysis 
allow comparison of the output reliability of alternative 
subsystem configurations. This analysis is illustrated in 
Section B.
A. Sensitivity Analysis 
This Section demonstrates the usefulness of analyzing 
the sensitivity of output reliabilities with respect to 
changes in input and component reliability parameters. Such 
information should be useful in the design of an internal 
control system. Also the result should help management in 
making decisions about personnel training for improving 
existing control systems.
100
101
To illustrate the above assertion, I propose to ana­
lyze the sensitivity of the reliability of output information 
from the following systems or subsystems;
1. A control component system (Fig. 4).
2. A three component system (two performance and one 
control type) (Fig. 16).
3. A two control component system for disbursement 
voucher review of quantity of items purchased 
(Fig. 17).
The reliability, of output information from a con­
trol system depends on the reliability parameters of all compo­
nents and the reliability of input information. This dependency 
can be expressed as a function of p:
Rq = f(p) (IV-1)
where p represents a reliability 'vector* consisting of the re­
liability parameters of the components of the system or subsys­
tem under study and of the input relieübility (the reliability 
of the input information).
A change in R^ can be written in terms of the changes 
in the reliability parameters as:
n
" 3[. Izr.p. (IV-2)
where
Ij » b R y a  Pj, and r^ , = Ap^/Pj (IV-3)
ARjj(j) = IjrjPj represents the increase in R^ due to in­
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crease in pj by rj percent.
In order to develop a reliability importance measure 
(Birnbaum, 1969) one can set ^R^(i) * idR^(j) and obtain a 
ratio of the percentage increases in Pj^  and p^:
r/Zj - IjPj/IiPi (IV-4)
which means that a r^  ^percent increase in p^ will increase R^ 
as much as a r^ percent increase in Pj. If r^/r^ « 5, this 
implies that Pj is more important than Pj^ ; a 1% increase in 
Pj is equivalent to a 5% increase in p^. One can define a 
matrix 'reliability importance ratio matix', representing 
these ratios as:
[=ij] * [V'j] ■
or
M  - 1-
Pj&Ro/bPj]
The elements of this matrix can give information at a glance 
about the relatively important parameters. This concept should 
become more clear when . specific examples are considered later.
1. A Control Component 
Consider a control component with input information 
having reliability and an output having reliability R^.
The reliability parameters of the control component are repre­
sented by P^r Pg and P^. The reliability, R^, of the output 
information is given by Eq. (11-16):
«0 = * V ^ ’o - v ]
The partial derivatives of R^ with respect to different 
parameters can be written as:
^ V ^ ^ i  “ ^ ■ ^w + ’^w^^c - ^e) (IV-7)
^ V ^ ^ w  = * e  -  * i  + ( P c  ■ ^ @ ) ^ i  ( IV -  8)
" ^ V ^ ^ c  " V w  ( I V - 9 )
^ V ^ ^ e  = (1 - (IV-10)
From Eqs. (IV-9) and (IV-10),one knows that 9R^/ÔP^
and àR^/^Pg, both are positive. However, one is larger than
the other depending on the value of R^: for R^>0.5, ( 3 R^/
^Pg)/( 3 R y )  Pg)>l and for R^< 0.5, ( 3 R y  3 P^)/( ^R^/^P^Xl,
As an example, consider R^ = 0.8 (R^> 0.5) then, 3R^/3 P^ =
0.8 P and 3 R / Ô P  = 0.2 P i.e. 3R /3P_ is four times w o e w o c
larger than BR^/A P^. This result implies that a change in 
P^ will make a change in R^ four times as big as the change 
produced by a similar change in P^. In other words, R^ is more
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sensitive to changes in than it is to P when R.S 0.5.
C 6 i
However, when R^^O.5, the relative importance of the
two pareuneters: and P^ is reversed. This is illustrated
through the following exartçle. Assume, Rj^  = 0.4, then from
Eqs. (IV-9) and (IV-10) ,one obtains: ^ R P^ = 0.4 P, ando • c w
= 0.6 P^ i.e. ( ^R / aP^)/( 3 r / à P ^ X l .  This im-
O  c  W  w  w 0  6
plies that R^ is more sensitive to P than it is to P . This o e c
result has an important implication. When it is known that 
the input information has a reliability more than 0.5, then 
P^ ( the probability that the control works properly given 
that the input is correct) is more important than P^. But 
when R^<0.5, P^ (the probability that the control works pro­
perly given that the input is incorrect) becomes more impor­
tant. This result is intuitively appealing. It says that 
when the input is more likely to be incorrect than correct, 
the detection and correction or errors (P^ ) becomes more im­
portant than the process of recognizing correct input (P^).
The partial derivative, )Rg/^ P^ in Eg. (IV-8) can be 
either positive or negative depending on the relative magni­
tude of R ,^ Pg and Pg. This provides an interesting result.
The negative value of BR^/A P^ means that if the probability 
that the control is in operation increases, the reliability of 
the output decreases, implying that the control is dysfunc­
tional. That is, it introduces more error than it corrects 
when 0Rq/^P^<0 .
To illustrate the êüDove point consider an example where
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Rj^  = 0.8 and = 0.9. These values yield ^Rq/ÔP^ = -0.2 for 
Pg = 0.3 (see Eq. IV-8). In fact the slope, %Rg/)P^, is always 
negative for R^ = 0.8 emd P^ = 0.9 if P ^ 0.4. This implies 
that for the parameter values given above the output relia­
bility, R^ is always less than the input reliability R^ (R^ =
0.78 for Rj^  = 0.8, P^ - 0.9, P^ = 0.3 and P^ = 1.0; use Eq. IV) 
for any value of P^ in the range: 1>P^>0. Whereas, when P^ = 0,
1.e. when the control is not in operation, R^ = R^. This sug­
gests that the existance of a control with the given parameters 
further contaminates the input information and reduces the out­
put reliability below the input value. Such a control is dys­
functional .
In order for a control to be effective, we must demand 
3r^/)P^>0. In general, this condition is achieved when (see
Eq. IV-8)
Pg - Ri + (Pg - Pg)Ri>0 (IV-11)
For P = P^, the control will be functional only when P_ =c e  ■* c
P^> Rj^ . This result should be useful in deciding about a per­
sonnel training program for completing a control process.
Again consider the example presented earlier where the control 
component was dysfunctional when Rj^  = 0.8, P^ = 0.9 and Pg<0.4. 
When pg is increased such that Pg^ 0.4, in the example, the 
control becomes functional (i.e. ^Rq/^P^'>0 for P^O.4, Rq = 0.8 
and Pg = 0.91. This meems that the presence of the control 
component will improve the output reliability. As P^ increases 
the output reliability increases and reaches a maximum at P^=l.
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Thus a higher likelihood (P^ ) of a control component being in 
operation produces a higher output reliability, if the control 
is functional (i.e. )R^/3p^0).
The above example demonstrates that by simply inf 
creasing from 0.4 to a higher value, the control component 
can be made functional. Such increases might be achieved by 
training personnel more thoroughly in techniques for error 
detection and correction or by improving automated procedures 
for error detection and correction.
A convenient approach to display and utilize these 
partial derivatives can be illustrated using the results from 
our example. Using the partial derivatives of Rq (Eq. IV-6) 
with respect to the different component parameters (Eq. IV-8, 
9, and 10) and the partial derivative with respect to R^
(Eq. IV-7), one can obtain the following expression for the 
'reliability importance ratio matrix', C, using Eq. (IV-5):
Ri Pw
P*
Pc
V  Vw
V  h
V  Vw
V  Vw
V ^ i  
V  Vw
V ^ i
Ww
V ^ i
Pc
V  Vw
Ww
Pe
V  Vw
Vw(i-V
V  \
Vw^^-V
'cVw
(IV-12)
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For = 0.8, = 0.98, = 0.95, and P^ = 0.9,
the matrix in Eq. (IV-12) becomes:
C =
*i ?w Pc Pe -,
^i 1.000 2.486 13.493 3.196
^w 0.402 1.000 5.429 1.286
^c 0.074 0.184 1.000 0.237
?e 0.313 0.778 4.223 1.000
(IV-13)
The interpretation of the numbers in different columns 
can be illustrated through the following example. The numbers 
in the third column mean that a 1.0% increase in P^ would in­
crease Rq as much as a 13*49% increase in R^, a 5.43% in P^,
or a 4.22% in P . It should be noted that the numbers in one e
row are reciprocals of the numbers in the corresponding column. 
For instance, the numbers in the third row are reciprocals of 
the numbers in the third column. After examining all elements 
of the matrix, one can tell that parameter P^ is the most im­
portant parameter, because the éléments in the corresponding 
column are the largest or the numbers in the corresponding row 
are the smallest. This result would be important when manage-i 
ment wants to efficiently improve the reliability of the output 
information, relative to changes in input or component relia­
bilities .
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2'. Three Components (Two Performance and 
One Control Type) in Series 
In this section, I want to present a sensitivity analy­
sis of a subsystem consisting of three components: two perfor­
mance types and one control type. These components are connec­
ted in series (Fig. 26). The main reason for presenting the 
sensitivity analysis for this subsystem is to demonstrate that 
the relative importance of the reliability parameters of a sys­
tem or subsystem changes as the configuration of the system or 
subsystem changes, i.e. as the components of the system or sub­
system are rearranged.
Here, I have chosen two of the possible configurations 
of the three components connected in series, for this study.
In the first configuration (Fig. 26a), the first two components 
are of the performance type. They are connected in series.
This combination is then connected to a third element, a con­
trol component, also in series.
In the second configuration (Fig. 26.b), the control 
component is placed between the two performance components. 
This implies that the information generated by the first ele­
ment is being checked for accuracy by the second element, a 
control component. The resulting information is then passed 
on to a third element (Performance type) to complete the task. 
However, the situation is different in the first configuration 
(Fig. 26.a) case. There, the first element (performance type) 
generates a piece of information, and the second element (per-
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Figure 26; Three components (two performance type 
and one control type) in series.
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formance type) completes a task using this information. The 
resulting information goes to a third element, the control com­
ponent, which makes a decision about whether the input infor­
mation is correct and then takes appropriate actions based on 
its findings.
It is shown through the present study that a configura­
tional change in a system or subsystem will not. only change the 
relative importance of the different reliability parameters, 
but would also affect the overall reliability of the output 
information. The sensitivity analysis for the two cases are 
presented below.
Configuration (a); Consider first the subsystem in 
Fig. 26.a. The reliability of the output information from this 
subsystem can be written in terms of the reliability parameters 
of the system components as:
"o - ^ ^2 [1 - P* + - P.l] + V w  "V-14)
where and Pg are the reliability parameters of the two per­
formance components and P^, P^, and P^ represent the character­
istic reliability parameters of the control component (see Table 
I for detail definitions). The above relation (Eg. IV-14) is 
easily derived by using the approach adopted in Chapter III.
The ’reliability importance ratio matrix,' C (Eg. IV-5) 
can be determined by first obtaining the following partial deri­
vatives of (see Eg. IV-14).
■ ‘' o - V w
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P-(Î>R /^P_) = R - P Po e w (IV-16)
- V 2V W (IV-17)
Pe<  ^ = (1 - V w  (IV-18)
(IV-19)
and then substituting them into Eg. (IV-5):
C = P
w
W w
W / w
W w
W w
W w
W w
W 2
W w
W 2
W / w
W w
% V w
W w
e^ w^
W 2
W w W w
W 2
W w W w
W 2
% V w % V w
% V w
(l -%)Vw
% V w  
W 2
W 2
W 2 > V w
W 2 :
(IV-20)
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The above matrix can novr be used to discuss special 
cases to show the relative importance of the different relia­
bility parameters. For example consider the following values
of the parameters : P^ - 0.85 ' P2 = 0.9, P = 0.95, P^ = 0.9,
and P„ = 0.95. These values yield:
*o = 0.9296 (IV-21)
and
Pi P2 Pc Pe Pw
^1 1.000 1.000 9.256 2.694 2.207
2^ 1.000 1.000 9.256 2.694 2.207
C = 0.108 0.108 1.000 0.291 0.238 (TV-22)
- »e 0.371 0.371 3.436 1.000 0.819
Pw 0.453 0.453 4.195 1.221 1.000
As discussed in the previous section, the parameter as­
sociated with the column containing the biggest numbers is the 
most important parameter. Here, parameter seems to be the 
most important one, as the column corresponding to P^(3rd column 
in Eg. IV-22) contains the largest numbers. The interpretation 
of the numbers in column three of matrix C is that a one per­
cent increase in P would increase R as much as a 9.256% in-c o
crease in P^ , 9.256% in P^ , 3.436% in P^ or a 4.195% increase 
in P .^ Thus for the given configuration of the subsystem and 
given parameter values, P^ is the most important parameter. The 
next most important parameter in this case is P . However, the
relative importance of the parameters may change when the values
113
of the parameters change without any configurational change. 
This is demonstrated through the following example.
Consider the following values of the parameters:
0.45, Pg = 0.9, P^ = 0.95, P^ = 0.9, and P^ = 0.95. Substi­
tuting these values in Eqs.(IV-14) and (IV-20), one gets:
and
C =
R = 0.8945 o
_ 2^
Pc Pe Pw .
^1 1.000 1.000 9.256 14.315 12.396
2^ 1.00 1.000 9.256 14.315 12.396
0.108 0.108 1.000 1.546 1.339
^e 0.0699 0.0699 0.647 1.000 0.866
^w 0.0807 0.0807 0.747 1.155 1.000
(IV-23)
(IV-24)
By an inspection of the elements in different columns 
of matrix C, one finds that P^ , P^ , and P^ are the parameters 
in the decreasing order of their importance. This ordering 
is quite different from the one obtained in the previous case 
(P^ , P^ and P^ in order of decreasing importance; see Eq. IV-22) 
This change in the relative importance of the parameters P^ ,
Pg and P^ can be interpreted in the following way. In the for­
mer case where P^ = 0.85 and P^  = 0.9, the reliability of the 
input information to the control component was 0.765 i.e. the 
input to the control element was more than 50% correct. There­
fore, it is important that when the control works it does not 
further contaminate the information by making a wj^ ong. judgment
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when the input is correct. The parameter associated with this 
process is and thus is the most important parameter in 
this case. In the latter case where Pj^ = 0.45 and P  ^= 0.9 
the input information to the control element has reliability 
0.405; i.e. the input information is less than 50% correct. 
Therefore, the correction process by the control element when 
the input is in error is more important than the correct judg­
ment when the input is error free. This implies that P^ is 
more important than P^ . Also one finds that P^ is more impor­
tant than P ,^ in the latter case. This result means that 
the probability that the control is in operation is more im­
portant than the probability that the control operates prop­
erly when the input is correct. This is again due to the 
fact that the input to the control element contains more 
incorrect information than correct information, and there­
fore the correction process and the process that the control 
is in operation became important, A similar result was ob­
tained in the case of a single control component as discussed 
in Sec. IV. A.I. A, change in the relative importance of the 
parameter due to a change in the configuration of the system 
is demonstrated in the following subsection.
Configuration (b): Here the control component is placed
between the two performance components (Fig. 16.b). The relia­
bility of the final output information from this subsystem 
can be again obtained by using the approach of Chapter III.
The result is
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"o = Pi?: [1 - P« + P»<Pc - Pe'] + PjPeP»
where and are the reliability parameters of the two per­
formance components and P , P and P are the characteristicw e e
reliabiltiy parameters of the control component.
The following partial derivatives of (Eq. IV-25) are 
used in determining the 'reliability importance ratio matrix'
C for this case;
P l f ê ' )  = *0 - PzPeP*
P2 (tpt) = "o
Pc I = PiPzPqP*
Pe (-1^) = ll-Pi'PePzP» "V-29'
f.. I ( = R - P,P. (IV-30)w I 0 12
The resulting matrix is:
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C =
w
V W w
V W w
W c ^ w
R
V W w
(l-Pl)P2Vw
% V w
w
v %
V W w
v %
v %
% V w
v %
L
W e ^ w
V % v %
% V w
v % v %
(IV-31)
For the following values of the parameters: =0.85,
=0.9, P =0.95, P =0.9 and P^ = 0.95, and C become:
R_ = 0.8441 o (IV-32)
C =
w
1.000 11.316 9.256 1.548 1.06
0.088 1.000 0.818 0.137 0.094
0.108 1.223 1.000 0.167 0.115
0.646 7.313 5.981 1.000 0.685
0.943 10.673 8.730 1.46 1.000
(IV-33)
117
Inspecting the columns of the above matrix, one finds 
that Pg, Pg, P^ , P^ and P^ are the parameters in decreasing 
order of their importance. Whereas in the previous case (con­
figuration (a), Fig. 16.a) for the same values of the para­
meters, the order was: P^, P^, P^ arid P^  ^or P^ (see matrix
columns in Eg. IV-22). This comparison shows that the rela­
tive importance of the parameters changes as the configuration 
of systems changes. It is also observed from Eqs. (IV-21) and 
(IV-32) that, for the same values of the reliability parameters 
of the components, the output reliability, is higher for 
configuration (a) (Fig. 26.a) than what it is for configura­
tion (b) (Fig. 26.b).
The above information seems useful when management is 
redesigning a control system and has a limited budget. The 
management can choose the control configuration that yields 
higher output reliability and then allocate resources to im­
prove those parameters which are relatively more in^ortemt 
in terms of absolute reliability. Use of the importance 
ratio as a guide to the allocation of resources should be 
tempered by cost considerations (which are beyond the scope 
of this study) unless management is willing to assume that 
the effectiveness of resources so consumed is proportional to 
the importance ratio. That is, that a dollar spent on P2 is
11.316 times as effective with respect to as would be the 
same dollar spent on P^ , etc.
3. A Disbursement Voucher 
Review Illustration 
The sensitivity analysis of a review process for the 
guzmtity of items purchased, in the preparation of a disburse­
ment voucher is presented here. Generally, a voucher clerk 
receives three inputs: an approved purchase order, a vendor's
invoice and a receiving report. In order to determine the cor­
rect quantity of items for payment, he compares the three pieces 
of input information to assume agreement in terms of the quan­
tity of items ordered, shipped (by the vendor), and received.
A schematic diagram for such a system is given in Fig. 27.
Vendor's Invoice
Vouche 
Review for
order (r KApproved purchas
giSêîSg*
Slip (Rpg) n Receiving 
report
Material /  
count- % ) -
Quantity
approved
payment
Figure 27: A subsystem for approving quantity of
items purchased for payment.
The receiving report preparation process functions like 
a control component for the error type (error in the quantity 
of items shipped and/or received) considered here. In general 
this component has two inputs: 1) the number of items shipped
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per the vendor's packing slip and 2) the number of items 
counted physically by the receiver. There are two possible 
structures and hence two different models of this component 
based on the order in which the material counting is done. In 
one case the material counting is done before seeing the quan­
tity on the vendor's packing slip. In the other, the counting 
is done after seeing the information on the packing slip. In 
the former case, the result of material counting is independent 
of the information on the packing slip. But in the later case, 
the result may be influenced by the information on the packing 
slip. A detailed comparison of the two reliability models of 
this component is presented in Section B of this chapter. This 
comparison illustrates the effect on output reliability asso­
ciated with structural changes in a system (or subsystem).
For the present study (sensitivity analysis), it is as­
sumed that the material counting is done independently of the 
information on the packing slip. It is also assumed that the 
component uses the number obtained through the material count, 
as a standard for making the receiving report. This assumption 
makes the reliability, of the information obtained through 
the material count, unity. This effectively reduces the number 
of input channels, in the receiving report subsystem from two 
to one. This can be demonstrated by setting one of the input 
reliability parameters to unity in the model (Eq. 11-24) of a 
two input control component developed in Section II.C.2.b.
The entire two control element system (Fig. 27) consists
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of the receiving report preparation element and its relation 
to the voucher review control component. The voucher review 
control component has two inputs in addition to the output 
from the receiving report preparation element. For simplicity, 
it is assumed that the probability that the two controls are 
in operation is unity. Therefore, the parameters that are of 
interest are : R ,^ R^ , R^^ , P^, P^ , R^ , Q^ , and
where R^ , R ,^ R^^, and R^ are respectively the reliability 
parameters of the vendor's invoice, approved purchase order, 
vendor's packing slip and of the receiving report. The other 
parameters that are characteristic of the control elements are 
defined in Table I.
The reliability of the receiving report for the quan­
tity of items received can be written in the following form 
(using Eq. 11-16 and P^ = 1) ;
Rr = + (1 - Ry)Pg (IV-34)
where R^ _, the reliability of the packing slip is replaced ps
by R^ , the reliability of the vendor's invoice. This can be 
done when the two documents are identical (packing slip is a 
carbon copy of the vendor's invoice) in terms of their informa­
tion regarding the quantity of material shipped.
The reliability, R^ of the output information (the 
quantity approved for payment) from the voucher review element 
can be determined in terms of the reliability parameters of the 
inputs and of the control components by using Eq.(11-31) with 
n = 3, and = 1. The result is
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V  Ole[<"-*v>Vr^ W < l - V V v l
+ 02^ l(i-V »-VV <^ -V <i-VV ‘^"V
+ QjgCtt-R^  (IV-35)
One can, now, perform the sensitivity analysis by the 
usual method of taking the partial derivatives and studying 
the relative slopes. The second method (Birnbaum 1969), using 
the 'reliability importance ratio matrix' C, however, pre­
sents a direct result regarding the relative importance of the 
different parameters. The following partial derivatives are 
used in obtaining matrix C (Eq. IV-5).
Rv( ) R y  a%) = Ro- OleVr"
-  O j g d - V  (l-R p) (IV-36)
K p ' ^ V ^ V  ' V  W r  - o&Bi-VV'i-V’V]
- Q^ (l-R^ ) (1-R^  (IV-37)
R^ ( )R/)Rp = V  Q j e W  02et<l-VV
-Qse^-V^^'V (IV-38)
Pc( PJ = Pc( ^ V  ( ^ V  ^ V
= (P^ RyP^ ) Rj. ( ^ Rg/() Rj.) ( IV-39 )
P^ ( )R/ 3Pg) =Pg()R/a%)()l^)R^)
= (P (^1-R )^/R^R^ ( )R/^ R^ ) (IV-40)
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Q^(>V2>°o>
+ (l-Rp)R^ R^ ] (IV-42)
Q z e ' ^ V »  °2e> ' 02eI‘l - V  + <^-Vp' r V r' p
P r'%_+ (1-Rj (1-RjR,^  ^ (IV-43)
°3e) = °3e^^"V (IV-44)
The numerical values of the reliability importance matrix C 
for different values of the parameters are given in Tables 
II - VI.
Table II suggests that for the given values of the para­
meters, the relative importance of these parameters are given
as follows; Qc/"QieV^p^\'^^cVQ2e^^e^^3e* and
the least important parameters are and Qg^, respectively. 
This result can be interpreted as follows. Since, all 
three inputs to the voucher review element are highly reliable 
(R^  = 0.92, Rp = 0.95, R^ = 0.96) it is much more important 
that the reviewing element makes a correct decision given the 
inputs are correct (process associated with Q^ ) than the pro­
cess of correcting errors when all the inputs are incorrect 
(process associated with . It is also observed that the
TABLE II
The Reliability Importance Ratio Matrix for R^ = 0.92, R^ = 0.95, = 0.96,
Pg = 0.93, = 0.97, 0^^ = 0.94, =0.9, and =0.85
^e ®le ^2e ®3e
1.000 1.043 0.972 0.082 28.54 5.08 0.285 0.0051
0.959 1.000 0.932 0.079 27.369 4.877 0.273 0.0049
1.029 1.073 1.000 0.084 29.367 5.233 0.293 0.0052
Pe 12.217 12.738 11.871 1.000 348.620 62.117 3.480 0.0619
Qc 0.035 0.037 0.034 0.003 1.000 0.178 0.010 0.0002
Ole 0.197 0.205 0.191 0.016 5.612 1.000 0.056 0.0010
Oze 3.511 3.661 3.412 0.287 100.191 17.852 1.000 0.0178
Oae 197.350 205.762 191.759 16.154 5631.469 1003.409 56.207 1.0000
Mw
TABLE III
The Reliability Importance Ratio Matrix for R^ = 0,55, R^ = 0.6, = 0.96,
Pg = 0.93, = 0.97, = 0.94, = 0.9, = 0.85
*v *P Pc Pe Qc Ole 02e Ose
1.000 1.107 1.070 0.848 15.951 23.826 9.315 0.4310
0.904 1.000 0.967 0.766 14.413 21.529 8.417 0.3894
0.934 1.034 1.000 0.793 14.904 22.263 8.704 0.4027
^e 1.179 1.305 1.262 1.000 18.804 28.088 10.981 0.5080
Qc 0.063 0.069 0.067 0.053 1.000 1.494 0.584 0.0270
Ole 0.042 0.046 0.045 0.036 0.669 1.000 0.391 0.0181
°2e 0.107 0.119 0.115 0.091 1.712 2.558 1.000 0.0463
Oae 2.320 2.568 2.483 1.968 37.014 55.287 21.615 1.0000
to•u
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parameter is more important than P^. Here again, since 
the input information to the receiving element is highly re­
liable (R^  = 0,92), the correct decision process when the in­
put is correct becomes more important than the process of cor­
recting errors when the input is in error.
When and are changed to 0.55 and 0.6, respective­
ly, leaving the other parameter values unchanged, the or­
der of importance of the parameters becomes (see Table III);
°le'^°c'^°2^^p^^cV\VPe'^°3e’ time the most and
the least important parameters are and Qjg» respectively. 
The parameter is now in second place, because the val­
ues of the reliabilities of the inputs have decreased consid­
erably (R  ^has changed from 0.92 to 0.55 and R^ from 0.95 to 
0.6) and thus the error correction process when one of the 
inputs is in error has become more important than the process 
of making correct decision when the inputs are correct (the 
process associated with Q^). Also is in the third posi­
tion in relative importance order, a considerably higher rank 
than it had in the previous case. This is again because the 
two inputs are not very reliable (R^  = 0.55 and R^ = 0.6).
The value of R and R_ were further decreased to 0.4V p
and 0.45, respectively, keeping all other parameter values 
unchanged. The 'reliability importance ratio matrix', C in 
Table IV for this case suggests the following order of the 
parameters for their relative importance :
R .^ As expected, the parameters and 0^^ are the first
TABLE IV
The Reliability Importance Ratio Matrix for R^ = 0.4, R^ = 0,45, = 0.96,
Pg = 0.93, = 0.97, = 0.94, = 0.9, and = 0.85.
*v ■'p
Pc Pe Oc Ole 02e Ose
1.000 1.141 1.104 1.605 11.397 30.745 21.158 1.1273
%
0.877 1.000 0.968 1.407 9.992 26.955 18.550 0.9844
0.906 1.033 1.000 1.453 10.321 27.843 19.161 1.0209
^e 0.623 0.711 0.688 1.000 7.103 19.161 13.186 0.7026
Oc 0.088 0.100 0.097 0.141 1.000 2.698 1.857 0.0990
Ole 0.033 0.037 0.036 0.052 0.371 '1.000 0.688 0.0367
®2e 0.047 0.054 0.052 0.076 0.539 1.453 1.000 0.0533
0.887 1.012 0.980 1.423 10.110 27.273 18.769 1.0000
tom
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and second most important parameters. The correction process 
is more important when the inputs have very low reliabilities 
(R^ = 0.4, Rp = 0.45). Also is no longer the least
important parameter. It is also interesting to note the 
change in the order of and P^. Here P^ is more important 
than Pg. The reason is again obvious. It is because the in­
put information to the receiving element is highly unreliable 
(R^ = 0.4) and hence the correction process when the input is 
in error (the process associated with P^), becomes more impor­
tant than the process of making a correct decision when the 
input is correct (the process associated with P^).
Table V presents the elements of the matrix C for R^ = 
0.45 and R^ = 0.9 with the other parameter values unchanged. 
The following order represents the relative importance of the
different parameters: QieV°cV°2e'^^p^^e^^c^*^v'^®3e*
Since one of the inputs to the voucher review element is highly 
unreliable (R^ = 0.45), becomes the most important para­
meter. Also P^ is more important them P_. Again it is due© w
to R^ being less than 0.5. It is observed that R^ and R^ oc­
cupy the 4th and 7th positions, respectively, in their relative 
importance order. If one follows the relative orders of R^ 
and R^ in all the previous cases, one finds that when R ^  R^,
R^ is more important than R^. However, when R^4 their re­
lative importance order is reversed as seen below.
In the last case considered here, where R^ and R^ are 
changed to 0.9 and 0.45, respectively and the other parameter
TABLE V
The Reliability Importance Ratio Matrix for R^ = 0.45, R^ = 0.9, = 0.96,
Pg = 0.93, = 0.97, = 0.94, = 0.9, = 0.85.
^e ^le ®2e ®3e
% 1.000 2.285 1.110 1.314 26.095 35.231 5.221 0.1860
0.438 1.000 0.486 0.575 11.419 15.418 2.285 0.0814
0.901 2.058 1.000 1.184 23.507 31.737 4.703 0.1675
^e 0.761 1.739 0.845 1.000 19.853 26.804 3.972 0.1415
Qc 0.038 0.088 0.043 0.050 1.000 1.350 0.200 0.0071
Qle 0.028 0.065 0.032 0.037 0.741 1.000 0.148 0.0053
Q2e 0.192 0.438 0.213 0.252 4.998 6.748 1.000 0.0356
0?. 5.378 12.288 5.970 7.068 140.326 189.458 28.077 1.0000
to
00
TABLE VI
The Reliability Importance Ratio Matrix for R^ = 0.9, R = 0.45, = 0.96,
Pg = 0.93, = 0.97, = 0.94, = 0.9, = 0.85.
*v % Pc Pe Qc Ole Oze Ose
% 1.000 0.437 0.975 0.105 11.626 15.529 2.111 0.0622
% 2.286 1,000 2.230 0.240
26.582 35.504 4.827 0.1422
1.025 0.448 1.000 0.108 11.922 15,923 2.165 0.0638
Pe 9.526 4.167 9.290 1.000 110.755 147.929 20,112 0.5922
Qc 0.086 0.038 0.084 0.009 1.000 1.336 0.182 0.0054
Ole 0.064 0.028 0.063 0.007 0.749 1,000 0,136 0.0040
Q2e 0.474 0.207 0.462 0.050 5.507 7.355 1.000 0.0295
Ose 16.086 7.036 15.687 1.689 187,020 249.791 33.961 1.0000
toVO
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values are left unchemged, the order of relative importance 
of the different parameters becomes (see Table VI) : Q^e^c^^ 
Qj^R^VP^RpVp^Qse. first three parameters and the last
one, Ogg are in the same order as they were in the previous 
case. However, the order of R^ and R^, and the order of P^ 
and Pg are reversed in relation to the previous case, i.e. R ^  
R^ and P^y Pg here, whereas in the previous case Rp*^Ry and 
P^-^P^. The reason for this reversal is the change in the va­
lues of R^ and Rp.
This study shows how sensitivity analysis can be used 
to obtain the relative importance of parameters. This result 
can then be used by management in providing job training and 
improving the performance of the system. As explained, next, 
the relative importance of these reliability parameters can 
also be used in comparative sensitivity analysis when studying 
alternative system configurations.
B. Comparative Structural Analysis
This section shows how to study the relative sensiti­
vity of structure selection decisions to changes in reliabili­
ty values. The example considered here compares two alterna­
tive configurations for a control component preparing a re­
ceiving report in an inventory acquisition system. The alterna­
tive configurations will be set out prior to examining the 
sensitivity of the selection decision to changes in reliability 
levels.
As assumed earlier in Section IV.A.3., the receiving 
report preparation component has two inputs; the number of 
items on the vendor's packing slip and the number obtained by 
direct material count. However, there are two possible struc­
tures of the component depending on the order in which the 
material counting is done in relation to seeing the number on 
the packing slip. In one case the material count will be in­
dependent of the information on the packing slip and in the 
other case it may be influenced by the information on the 
packing slip. The reliability models in the two cases are dif­
ferent. Also the output reliabilities in the two cases are 
significantly different. The details are presented below.
Structure (a): In this case, the control component,
preparing the receiving report, receives two inputs. The two 
inputs are considered to be independent of each other. That 
is the material counting is done before seeing the number on 
the packing slip. A schematic diagram of the information
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flow for this case is presented in Fig. 28. Since the two 
input channels are independent of each other and one of them
Vendor's packing 
slip (Rps>
Material count
-i—
Receiving . »(a). 
report
<v>
Figure 28: A control component preparing a receiving
report. Physical count is taken before 
seeing the vendor's packing slip.
is redundant, the reliability model for this case can be ob­
tained directly from Eg.(11-27) by substituting the correspond­
ing reliability parameters (Q^  is assumed to be unity, i.e. 
the control is always in operation):
.(a)
r ''ps*'mc''c ^ ‘'ps'*'mc''le  ^‘'ps'* ‘'mc''*le
+ (1-Rpg)(l-R^c)02e (IV-45)
where R _ and R _ are the reliabilities of the two inputs: ps me
the packing slip and the initial material count, respectively.
and respectively, represent the reliability parameters
of the component associated with the process of preparing a 
'correct' receiving report when only the material count is cor­
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rect and when only the packing slip is correct. The parameters 
Og and Qgg are defined in Table I.
By defining the following parameters:
I • = p n X M  —p  ^n P
and
K  ' + <1-V>02e
one can rewrite Eg. (IV-45) as:
■*r“’ ' + < 1 - V ’^ è (IV-48)
This equation, which represents the reliability model of the 
component in Fig. 28, is used later in this section for com­
parison with structure (b) (Fig. 29).
It is important to point out, here, that the differ­
ent parameters (Qg, Qie^» Qle”' and 02e) associated with the 
preparation of a correct receiving report and the various 
input conditions, usually will take high values because the 
report maker may decide to recount the material in case the 
first count disagrees with the packing slip. This process, 
it seems, would increase the liklihood of preparing a correct 
receiving report which in turn would lead to high values of 
the control parameters (Qg, O^gP, t and Û2e  ^• The effect 
of high values of these parameters on the output reliability, 
is very significant. As one can see through Eg. (IV-45) 
or Eg. (iy-48) . Even if the input reliabilities (Rpg and 1^) 
are small, the output reliability, will be high if the
control parameters are high. This can be demonstrated through
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the following example.
Let Qg = 0.95, -  0.9, = 0.92, and 0^^ = 0.8.
For = 0.4 and R^^ = 0.5, from Eqs. (IV-46)-(IV-48), one
obtains: = 0.92, = 0.848 and R^ ^^  = 0.884. Similarly
one can show in general that P ,^ and R^ *^ take high values
if Q^i and are high, irrespective of the values
of the input reliabilities, R^_ and R^^. These results willps me
be useful when a comparison is made between the two output 
reliabilities for the two structures, later in this section.
Structure (b); In this case, the two inputs are not 
independent of each other. To be more explicit, the material 
count will be influenced by the information on the packing slip. 
Thus the correctness of the number determined through the 
material count may depend on the correctness of the number on 
the packing slip. The information flow diagram in this case 
can be schematically presented as Figure 29.
Materia]/
Vendor’s packing /  counting \  Receiving
"and receiving \ _______  ( R^ )^)
rt ] 
cat:
(P)
slip (R ) \  repo pre- /  Report ^
P ^  par ion
Figure 29: A control component preparing a receiving 
report. Physical count is taken after seeing 
the vendor’s packing slip.
Here, in effect, the control component receives one 
input which is the number on the vendor's packing slip. Then,
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the component determines the number through a material count 
and prepares the receiving report. The reliability model 
for this structure can be obtained directly from Eg. (11-16) 
by substituting appropriate parameters (it is assumed that 
= 1, i.e., the control is always in operation):
Where represents the relieüsility of the component given that 
the vendor's packing slip is correct, and P^ is the likelihood 
of preparing a correct receiving report when the input (packing 
slip) is wrong. Since, in this case, the outcome of the material 
count is dependent on the information on the packing slip, it 
is reasonable to assume that the likelihood, P^, of preparing 
a correct receiving report when the number on the packing slip» 
is correct is much higher than P^.
The above result (i.e. P^)^Pg) has important implica­
tions for the output reliedaility of the component. As one can 
see from Eg. (IV-49) (see also lines FD and ED in Fig. 30) for 
small values of R^g, the output reliability R^^  ^will be low 
if p^ is assumed to be high and P^ low. For example, assume 
that Pg = 0.98, Pg = 0.1 and R^g = 0.5, then from Eg.(IV-49)
= 0.54. One can also see that if there is a complete 
dependency (i.e. P^ = 1, and P^ = 0) then R^ ^^  « R^g, which im­
plies that the output reliabiltiy is the same as the input re­
liability and thus the control has no effect or useful purpose.
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1.0
(a)
0.6
(b)
0.4 IT)
'vo
ICM|in(b)
0.2 o A
0.0
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.00.0
ps
(.)Figure 30: Variation of receiving report reliability, R'*V
with the input reliability, Rpg, for the two configu­
rations, a and b. Line AG represents variation of Rj. 
for configuration (a) with Pj, = 0.8 and Pg = 0.6.
Lines ED and FD represent variation of R^ for configu­
ration (b) with parameter values: Pg = 0.98 and P@ =
0.1, and,' Pg = 0.98 and Pg = 0.4 , respectively.
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A comparison of the output reliabilities for the two struc­
tures is presented below. It shows that one structure of the 
control component is preferred to the other for a certain 
range of values of the input reliability parameter, R^g.
Comparison of the two Structures; As assumed earlier,
the parameters P* dnd P* defined in the case of structure (a),
have high values. As a result, R^^^, the output reliability
for structure (a) is also high irrespective of the value of the
reliability of the packing slip, R . On the other hand, the
P®
output reliability, R^^^ for structure (b) depends heavily on 
Rpg. As discussed earlier, it is low for low values of Rpg 
and high for high values of Rpg. A direct comparison between 
the two output reliabilities, R^®^ and R^^^, shown in Fig. 30 
suggests that for given values of parameters P^, P^, P^ and P^, 
R^®) is higher than R^^^ at low values of Rpg (the packing slip 
reliability) and vice versa at large values of Rpg. Thus struc­
ture (a) is preferred to (b) if input reliability, Rpg is low, 
but structure (b) is preferred over (a) when input reliability 
is high.
The above result is of great importance in the design 
and implementation of a control system, because it provides in­
formation regarding the preferability of a certain structure 
over another structure for a control system with given control 
parameters. It should also be pointed out that such structural 
changes may not involve additional cost to management. Rather, 
it may provide conditions for behavioral changes that may im­
prove output reliability.
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In Fig. 30 line AG represents the variation of the 
output reliability, with respect tô for structure
(a) with parameter values; = 0.8 and P^ = 0.6 (e.g. =
0.8, = 0.8, = 0.6, = 0.6 and O^R^^^l). Lines
ED and FD represent, respectively, the variation of with
Rpg for P^ = 0.98 and P^ = 0.1, and P^ = 0.98 and P^ = 0.4.
It is observed (see Fig. 30) that structure (a) with given para­
meter values is uniformly dominant over structure (b) in the 
region AB. Also it is seen that structure (a) is uniformly in­
ferior to (b) in the region CD. But in the region BC the choice 
of structure (a or b) depends on the particular choice of para­
meter values for structure (b). For instance when P^ = 0.1, 
structure (a) is preferable to (b) in the region BC, but when 
Pg = 0.4, structure (b) is preferable to (a). This preference 
for different structures for different regions of Rpg is shown 
by solid lines in Fig. 30. The point where the two structures
are indifferent (R°_) varies when the parameter values areps
changed. For example, when P^ = 0.1 is changed to P^ = 0.4, 
the indifference point moved from C to B.
One can determine an analytical expression for the in­
difference point, R°_ for this case by setting the two ottputps
reliabilities equal to each other, i.e., R^ ^^  = R^^^. This 
yields
pi - p
R° = ------ ---- --------  (IV-49)
(Pc “ Pc) (Pé - Pe)
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When = Pg, that is when the likelihoods of correctly pre­
paring the receiving report given that the information on the
packing slip is wrong, are equal in the two cases, then R° =0.ps
This means that one structure is always preferred over the 
other depending on the relative values of P^ and P^ . For ex­
ample, if P^^ P^ and P^ = P^ then structure (b) is preferred 
for all values of Rpg* However, when P^< P^ and P^ = P^ (i.e.
R° =0), then structure (a) is preferred over structure (b) ps
of the control component for all values of R . Similarly,ps
for P" = P , i.e. R =1, one can show that one struc- c e ps
ture is preferred over the other for all values of input relia­
bility, R In this case, the relative values of P' and P_ ps e e
determine the preferable structure. For example, in this case, 
when Pg'>Pg structure (a) is always preferred.
The results obtained here are congruent with intuitive 
results. For example, it was observed in the above analysis 
that when the input reliability of the packing slip is high, 
structure (b), in which the material count is influenced by the 
information on the slip, is preferred. This is what one would 
expect when it is known that the vendor's packing slip is al­
ways correct. In other words, it is far better to depend on 
the vendor's slip when it is more or less always correct than 
to make an independent count and risk contaminating the informa­
tional output as a result.
In addition to the above results, Fig. 3Q provides 
information on how accurately one needs to evaluate the input
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reliability, when making decision about which structure
to implement. To illustrate this point, consider the case
where control parameters' values are: P^ ' = 0.8, P^ ' = 0.6,
Pg = 0.98 and Pg = 0.4. Thus, lines AG and FD are of interest
for the present discussion. It is clear from Fig. 30 that
when the estimated value of the input reliability, R fallsps
far away from the indifference point B then even a relatively 
large estimation error in Rpg would Be tolerable, i.e., even 
a relatively large estimation error in Rpg would not affect 
the decision about whether to implement structure (a) or (b). 
But when the estimated value of Rpg falls near point B, a 
large estimation error is intolerable because it could affect 
the decision outcome.
In general^ the largest estimation error that will not 
affect the decision is |Rpg - Rpg|. This can be expressed in
terms of percentage of Rpg as;
^ps % s
marginal estimation error =   (IV-50)
For the control parameter values considered above, the indiff­
erence point, R° = Q.526. Thus the 'marginal estimation ps
error' is 31.5% (Fq. iy-50X when R = Q.4. This means thatps
an estimation error in Rpg of up to 31.5% when Rpg = Q.4,
will not affect the decision. But when R__ is estimated top s
be 0,5 then the 'marginal estimation error' becomes 5.2%, 
meaning that an error of more than 5.2% in the estimation of 
Rpg could affect the decision outcome.
CHAPTER V
FIELD STUDY
This chapter presents the method and the results of a 
field study conducted in support of the reliability models 
developed in the previous chapters. The chapter is divided into 
two sections. The first section deals with the approach used 
to collect the data for the study. The second section presents
a discussion of the results of the field study.
The following control and performance components of an 
inventory acquisition system were chosen, for the field study :
Control Components;
1. Disbursement Voucher Review for Quantity: A
single input control component.
2. Disbursement Voucher-Review for Price: A two
input control component.
Performance Components :
1. Inventory Pricing: A performance component with
two input channels.
Detailed discusssions of these components are presented later 
in the chapter.
The main objective of the field study was to compare 
the reliability values developed using the proposed reliëüai-
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lity model with direct measurement of the reliability para­
meters for the system being studied. To accomplish this ob­
jective, reliability parameters associated with input informa­
tion were evaluated. A major portion of this chapter is de­
voted to explaining the modeling and evaluation process.
A. Method of Field Study
There were several principal steps involved in comple­
ting the field study. These were: 1) selection of a firm; 2)
selection and modeling of internal accounting control compo­
nents; 3) collection of data; and 4) evaluation of reliability 
parameters. Each of these steps warrants further discussion.
The following paragraphs present these discussions.
The main criterion in selecting a firm for the study 
was the degree of deviation from prescribed norms in the com­
pany's internal control system. A company with a moderate rate 
of deviation in one of its internal accounting control systems 
was preferred, in order to avoid studying and sampling rare events, 
Also a heavy volume of routine inventory purchases, controlled 
with a voucher system, was required in order to avoid sampling 
of rare events (errors). It was also required that the purchase 
orders (POs) or purchase requisitions (PRs) be numbered serially. 
This was required to facilitate the sampling procedure. A preli­
minary interview was arranged with the Vice President of Finance 
of the candidate company to discuss the feasibility of conduc­
ting the study using their data and to find out whether the 
company's internal accounting controls met our objectives.
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Subsequently, a meeting was arranged with, the company's 
internal audit manager to discuss and obtain a preliminary un­
derstanding of the firm's internal accounting controls. This 
step helped in making a decision about what components to study. 
The ease of obtaining the required data was a deciding factor 
in selecting the components. These components were listed 
earlier. The modeling procedures for these components are pre­
sented in the next section.
The next step in the field stduy was to collect data 
from the system. The first step in this process was to deter­
mine, in detail, the needed information. The following list 
presents the data required for the study:
1. The quantity (q^ )^ of items on the purchase order 
(PO) to be studied.
2. The quantity (q^ )^ of items on the vendor's in­
voice (VI).
3. The quantity (q^ )^ of items received and accepted 
by the receiver on the receiving report CRR).
4. The quantity (q^ )^ of items on the approved voucher 
(VO) for disbursement.
5. The per unit price, p^^, of items on the PO.
6. The per unit price, p^^, of items on the VI.
7. The per unit price, of items on the VO for
disbursement.
There were 1202 POs and the corresponding documents 
(Vis, RRs and VOs) of interest for the period (October 1981-
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January 1982) under study. Only 400 of these were randomly 
selected for the study. Of these 400 POs only 379 POs were 
used in the study, the remaining 21 POs were not yet completely 
processed and thus they were excluded from the sample. A four 
digit random number table (Arkin 1974) was used to select the 
sample of the PO numbers. Once a PO number was selected, the 
corresponding vendor's name was obtained from a log book main­
tained in the purchasing department. Knowing the vendor's name, 
the voucher for disbursement and the related PO, RB and VI were 
pulled from the voucher file maintained under the vendor's 
name. A careful study of the above documents provided the in­
formation needed for the study. To facilitate the data col­
lection process, the data for each PO selected was recorded 
on a work sheet as shown in Fig. 31.
To expedite processing and to provide uniformity among 
sampling units, certain field work processing rules were deve­
loped. Many times, for one PO there were several Vis, RRs and 
VOs. Thus to collect all the information related to a PO one 
had to trace all the different Vis, RRs and VOs that correspon­
ded to that particular PO. Similarly, one PO often contained 
several different items. In such cases only one line item for 
which the total purchasing cost was the highest was selected 
for study. The reason for selecting one line item was to treat 
each PO equivalently, i^ e. each PO studied, supposedly, contained 
one kind of item. The reason for selecting the line item with 
highest purchasing cost was materiality, i.e. an error in such
Purchase 
Order Ho. 
6
Date
Vendor*a 
Name
Part
Number
Correct
Quantity
(qc>
Correct
Price
(Pc)
PO(approved) Vendor's Invoice Disbursement
Voucher
Quantity 
Received 
and acce­
pted (Sra)
Remarks
So Ppo S i Pyi S o Pyo
a»in
Figure. 31: Worksheet for data collection.
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cases could have material impact. If the total costs of dif4 
ferent items were the same then the first item was selected.
On many occasions, as a matter of general policy one 
PO was used to order one kind of item in different amount at 
different times. Thus one PO might have several Vis, RRs and 
VOs depending on the number of scheduled deliveries. In such 
situations, the delivery schedule for which the total purchasing 
cost was the highest was selected. If all the scheduled de­
liveries were equally costly then the first delivery time was 
considered for the study:
The last phase of the field study was the evaluation 
of the reliability parameters of the input information and of 
the system components. Since the processes for which the re­
liability parameters are defined (see definitions in Chapter 
II) are Bernouli processes (absence or presence of a given er­
ror type in the input information or in the completion of a 
task), the parameters can be evaluated by their unbiased esti­
mators . (Larsen and Marx 1981). As an example, the unbiased 
estimator for the reliability of.POs for correct pricing can 
be given as:
(Number of POs with no price de­
viation from the correct price) 
t .    (V-1)
PO
(Total number of POs investigated)
The other parameters (estimated by similar difinitions) are 
given in the next section.
B. Reliability Models arid Field Study Results 
This section describes the models of the components 
studied and presents the results of the field study. The field 
data are used here to evaluate the reliability parameters.
These parameters are then used in the reliability models to 
predict the reliability of the output information. These pre­
dicted values are then compared with the values obtained di­
rectly from the output data. These steps are discussed below 
in detail for the three components tested.
1. Disbursement Voucher Review for Quantity:
A Single Input Control Component
This component was established by management to review 
Vis, POs and RRs as a means for determining the correct quan­
tity of material for which the firm would pay. Two criteria 
were used in deciding the 'correct' quantity (q^ ). In one cri­
terion, the quantity for which payment is made shall not exceed 
the lessor of the quantity ordered (q^ )^ or the quantity re­
ceived and accepted (q _). The second criterion, which was the 
company's policy, differed slightly when the material was over­
shipped; an overshipment of 10% or less was allowed to be re­
ceived, and if accepted (acceptance depends on the quality and 
nature of material), it was considered to be the 'correct' quan­
tity for payment. The first rule is a stricter criterion than 
the company's policy. It was selected because it would provide 
a higher error rate than the company's policy and thus a smaller 
sample size would suffice.
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It appears that the disbursement voucher review compo­
nent is a control component with three input channels. The 
three inputs being and for each PO. However,
since the two channels (PO and RR) are used in deciding the 
correct amount of material for payment, the component effec­
tively becomes a single input channel control component with 
^vi the only input informa’tion. The output information is 
g^^, the quantity on the disbursement voucher (see Fig. 32).
9yi ^/Reviews._____ %o
if Procès^ Disbursement 
Invoice y Voucher
Figure 32; Disbursement Voucher review for correct 
quantity for payment.
The reliability model for such a component was devel­
oped in Chapter II. The result is (Eg. 11-16):
*vo ■ (V-2)
where R^^ and R^^ are the reliabilities of the input and the 
output information, respectively. The above parameters are 
evaluated by the following estimators:
”vo'^yo*V?vlüçl (v-4)
$ . — ---     (V-5)
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e
A
*vo
V ’vi’' 9c)
N (g = g ) vo'^vo (V-6)
*vo
where the different Ns are defined in Table VII.
The total sample of 379 POs, Vis, and associated RRs 
and VOs were picked from a pool of such documents processed 
during the four month period. This sample was divided into 
two groups corresponding to two, two-month periods. The sample 
size for the first two-month period was 186 and 193 for the 
second period. For each VI and VO, and were matched 
with the corresponding q^ (the correct quantity for disburse­
ment) to search for deviations. The number of Vis and VOs 
that had no deviations were noted. The number of VOs that had 
no deviation were divided into two groups: one in which the
corresponding q^ j^ s = q^s and the other where q^ j^ s ^ q^s. There 
are two managerial policy concepts that were considered in de­
ciding the correct quantity, q^ for payment (Both of these pol­
icies were discussed earlier in this section). Table VIII pre­
sents the results for both the cases.
The reliability parameters P^, P^ and R^^ are
computed using Eqs. (V-3)-(V-6) and Table VIII and the results 
are presented in Table IX. The values of R^^, evaluated di­
rectly, for the two periods are within 3.5% of each other.
TABLE VII
List of Definitions of Different Numbers (Ns)
N - Total number of Purchase Orders (POs) in the 
^ sample.
N i - Total number of Vendor's Invoices (Vis) in the 
sample.
N - Total number of Disbursement Vouchers (VOs) in 
the sample.
N (P^Pp)" Number of Purchase Orders (POs) for which 
the corresponding Vis have correct price 
i ' G .  P c -
' V  • Pc>
N .(Pvi= Pc) - Number of Vis with correct Vendor's 
Invoice price.
N^q (P^ q= Pg) - Number of VOs with correct voucher price.
N .(Qvi- 9c) " Number of Vis with correct quantity of 
material.
N (qvi= 9c) " Number of VOs for which the corresponding
Vis have correct quantities i.e. q .= q .^vi c^
N„„(q„ =q„)~ Number of Vos with correct quantity for 
 ^ disbursement.
^vo(^vi~^c' Ppo" P(.) - Number of VOs for which the corres­
ponding Vis and POs have correct prices.
N^^ (P^ j^ =Pgf Ppo^ Pg) - Number of VOs for which the corre-
ponding Vis prices are correct but the POs 
prices are not.
■N (p p f p = p ) - Number of VOs for which thevo^vi - c po '^c
corresponding POs have correct prices but
not the Vis.
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TABLE VII (CONTINUED)
Pc Ppo^ Pg) - Number of VOs for which both the 
prices, and p^^ are incorrect.
N (p„„= P  »a = a ) - Number of VOs with correct nricesVO Vo C "VO "C
and quantities.
N__(p_J= p_/p .= p ) - Number of POs with correct prices po po C VI c
given that the corresponding Vi's prices are
correct.
Npo(Ppo= Pc^Pvi^ Pg) - Number of POs with p^^= p^ given
that the corresponding Vi's prices are in­
correct.
^Vo^^vo" ‘^c'^ v^o” " Number of VOs with correct quanti­
ties given that the voucher's prices are 
correct.
N (q = q /q .= q ) - Number of VOs with correct quanti-VO VO ■ C VI c
ties given that the corresponding Vi's quan­
tities are also correct.
Nvo(qvo^ VOs with q^^= q^ given
that the corresponding Vis quantities are in 
error.
Nvo(Pvo= Pc/Pvi" Ppo= Pc) ■ VOs with p^^= Pc
given that the corresponding p .s and p s 
are equal to p^s.
^vo^Pvo= Pc/Pvi^ Pc'Ppo= Pc) ■ VOS with Pyc= Pc
given that the corresponding p^^^ p^ and PpQ=
Nvo(Pvo“ Pc/Pvi= Pc'Ppo^ Pc) " VOS with P^p= Pc
given that the corresponding p .= p and
V ^ P o -
N^o<Pvo= Pc^Pvi’' Pc-Ppo** Pc> - ''°= Pvo' Pc
given that the corresponding p .7^ p and p M P_vi C jpO C •
N (qxp=q xp /q = q ,p. = p ) - Number of VOs with correct VO  ^ c c VO ^c VO c
inventory values given that the vouchers have
correct prices and quantities.
TABLE VIII
Number of Vendor's Invoices and Disbursement Vouchers with 
and without Deviations in Their Respective Quantities
Mgt.
Policy
for
payment
Period v^i v^o ^vo%ï 9c) V
9vi=9c )
”vo^9^ 9c)
V % i
v^o
for
no
•ZS 
4J 0)
C &! (0a> P.r-i
a s "(d cn i-i O4 M  0) 
0) -P
First
Period 186 153 186 153 153
33 12 165
Second
Period 193 164 193 164
16 3 29 12 175
mrHnJh 1 H
0 M M
I4H 0) (U 
A  P A
0 -rl
0 > a 
3  0  0)
First
Period 186 173 186 173 173 13
10 183
Second
Period 19 3 173 193 173 173 20
12 185
inNJ
TABLE IX
Reliability Parameters for Disbursement Voucher Review for Quantity
Mgt. Policy 
for
payment
Period *vi Pc Pe
VO
(Direct)
*vo
(Predicted) %diff.
Mo
4J 0)
§ c! ”
#3.3
nJ Di M O: k 0) (U -P
a S e
First
Period 0.8226 1.0 3.3636 0.8871 0.891 0.4
Second
Period 0.8497 0.9939 3.4138 0.9067 0.9043 -0.3
(0iH
10
k 1 -H
O k k 
■P 0) (U 
 ^4J
c ° e<U dP 
g O  TJ
0. k Pi 
0) -H 
O >J3
a 0 m
First
Period 0.9301 1.0 3.7692 0.9839 0.972 -1.2
Second
Period 0.8964 1.0 0.6 0.9585 0.9761 1.8
mw
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This suggests that the system can be assumed to be stable 
during the two periods. It is also noted (see Table IX) that 
and did not change significantly over the periods. 
However, there is a 13.8% increase in from the first period 
to the second period (see Table IX) as computed for the policy 
where no payment is allowed for overshipped materials. There­
fore, it is likely that the process of correcting errors when 
the input is in error has improved in the second period by 
eübout 13.8%. f'Then the second criterion (no payment for over 
10% overshipped material) is considered for deciding a correct 
quantity, q ,^ the parameter, P^ decreases by 22% from the first 
period to the second period. This shows that with the second 
criterion, the process of correcting errors in the input in­
formation deteriorated during the second period compared to 
what it was during the first period.
In general, the following steps were involved in va­
lidating a reliability model of a component. First, the out­
put reliability for a period was computed, using : 1) the model, 
2) the estimated input reliability for the period, and 3) the 
estimated values of the component's parameters (for another 
period). Second this predicted value of the output reliabi­
lity (for a period) was compared with the estimated value 
from the data of that period. In this case, the predicted 
values of (the output reliability) for the two periods
and for the two q decision criteria/ were within 1,8% of theirc
direct estimates (see Table IX). This result shows that the
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model used here (Eq, V -2) appears to be a valid model for 
this component, A more detailed study is needed to validate 
the model statistically.
It should be pointed out that the values of and 
Pe for each period are significantly different (see Table IX), 
This suggests that the likelihood of a correct review given 
that the input is correct does differ from the likelihood of 
a correct review when the input is incorrect, as assumed in 
Chapter II,
2. Disbursement Voucher Review for Price:
A Two Input Control Component
The task of this component is to establish a price 
per unit for disbursement after having reviewed the related 
PO and VI. This element has two inputs (see Fig. 33): the
price Pp^ from the PO and the price, p^^ from the VI. The 
output is the voucher price, used for disbursement pur­
poses. The following criteria are used in deciding the 'cor­
rect' price for payment.
1. When the Vendor's Invoice price is equal to the 
Purchase Order price (i.e. p^^= Pp^) then PO price 
is considered to be the correct price unless it
is detected that both the prices are incorrect 
and a third price is correct.
2. When the Vendor's Invoice price is less than Pur­
chase Order price (i.e. P^i^Pp^) then the VI price 
is taken to be correct i.e. p^ = p^^.
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3. When the Vendor’s Invoice price is greater than 
the PO price (i.e. ^ jL>Ppoi then the PO price is 
taken to be correct i.e. ^  = p^^.
The above policy is only em assumed policy for the 
present study. The actual policy in practice by the company 
was a little different. They differed on the third point 
where Pp »^ they allowed payment for any unfavorable
price variance of up to $20 or 10%. The former criterion is 
used in evaluating the reliability parameters.
Ppo
Price on PO
Voucher 
Review 
Process 
,for Pri
VO
Price on VO
VI
Price on VI
Figure 33: Disbursement Voucher review for price.
The reliability model developed in Chapter II for a 
control component with two input channels similar to the com­
ponent in Fig. 33 is not applicable here. The reason being 
that the two input channels are assumed to be independent in 
the earlier derivation. In the present case, they are not in 
fact, independent. Thus, an appropriate reliability model 
was developed before the field data was analysed. The follow*
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ing paragraphs develop this model,
"Theoretical Model; Consider the following 'events’ 
related to this component ;
Thé correct state of the vendor's invoice i.e.
p^^ = p^ ( the correct price).
SpQ- The correct state of the purchase order i.e.
^po” ^c*
- The voucher review process functions properly.
S„_“ The correct state of the voucher i.e. p. = p .VO VO c
The state of the output information can be written
in terms of and as;
Svo- '' V "  ®<=’ ^  V  ®c> "
ISvi" Spo" <=vi " ®po'' ®c>
which states that the output information is correct when the 
two inputs are correct and the voucher review process functions 
properly or the price on the vendor's invoice is incorrect 
and the price on the purchase order is correct and the voucher 
review process is functioning properly or the vendor's price 
is correct and the purchase order price is wrong and the re­
view process is correct or both the prices are incorrect but 
the review process functions properly and finds the correct 
price.
Rewriting Eq. (V-7) in probability form, one gets:
+ '■'Syi'' S o ' ' V
+ F (Si''So" S' + "(Si" So" S' (v-8'
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where P represents the probability of the. event given in the 
argument of P,
Using the product rule in probability Eq. (V-8) can 
be written as :
+ p(^i)E'< " Spo>
This equation represents the reliability model for the compo­
nent considered here. In order that the above equation be in­
terpreted properly, the detailed definitions of. the different 
probabilities are given in Table X. Based on these defini­
tions, the reliability parameters in Eq. (V -9) can be evalu­
ated using the following estimators:
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l,s /s ,ns , = <V-14,
° ”  *’° \ o K c  V “ Pc'
^vo^Pvo Pc^Pvi^c'Ppo Pc'
p(sys .n s .  ) =
^vo ^ v^o~
P '''■ P° «vc'Pvi''Pc'Ppc*^c'
The detailed definitions of the different numbers used 
in the above equations are given in Table VII.
TABLE X
Definitions of Reliability Parameters used 
in the Reliability Model of Disbursement 
Voucher Review for Price
P(S ) Probability that the voucher price is
correct.
P(S .) Probability that the vendor's price is
correct.
P(S /S .) Probability that the PO price is correct
P ^ given that the vendor's price is correct.
P(S /S .) Probability that the PO price is correct
" given that the vendor's price is in­
correct.
P (S /S .ns ) Probability that the voucher review pro-
 ^ P cess is correct given that both the input
prices, p^^ and p^^ are correct.
P(S /S .nS ) Probability that the voucher review pro-
P cess is correct given that p p and
Ppo"
P(S /S .flS ) Probability that the voucher review pro^
P cess is correct given that p .= p and
Ppo^ Pc-
P (S ) Probability that the voucher review pro-
 ^ P cess is correct given that the two input
prices are incorrect i.e. p p and
W  Pc-
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Field Study Results; The sample that was used in the 
case of the previous component is used again for this study.
The sample for the two periods is the same (186 documents for 
the first period and 193 for the second). For each PO and re­
lated VI and VO, a correct price (p^ ) was established based on 
the first criterion discussed earlier. The number of PCs, vis
and VOs that had no deviations from the correct price were noted
for different given conditions. The results are listed in
Table XI. The reliability parameters for this were then eval­
uated using Eqs. (V-10)-(V-17) and Table XI. The values are 
presented in Table XII.
It is observed that this subsystem is also stable during 
the two periods since the values of the reliability parameters 
for the two periods are close to each other (within 2.8% except 
for one parameter, see Table XII). The predicted values of 
P(&yg) (the reliability of the output information) for the two 
periods using the model (Eq. V-9) were within 0.3% of the di­
rectly measured values (see Table XII). Thus, the model devel­
oped here appears to be an appropriate model for the component.
It may be of interest to note that the two probabilities 
P(S^/S^j^n Sp^ ) and P(S^/S^^ A S^ )^ are significantly different 
(see Table XII). This result is unlike the assumption made in 
Chapter II. There, the two probabilities were assumed to be 
equal. No general conclusion can be drawn from this finding 
because the decision rule used in this case differed from that 
of the company. However, if it were to be generalizable it 
would mean that the likelihood of a correct review depends on
TABLE XI
Number of Vendor's Invoices, Purchase Orders and 
Disbursement Vouchers with and without 
Deviation in their Respective Prices 
for Different given Conditions
Mgt. Policy 
for payment 
assumed
No payment for any over 
priced material
Periods 
NS X
First
Period
Second
Period
\ o
186 193
182 192
«Vi 186 193
«Vi IPvi= Po> 179 191
«TO 'Pvi= Pc>
179 191
Np„(Pvi/ P^) 7 2
«po^Ppo” Pc^Pvi” Pq ^ 170 184
«po'Ppo= P / P v i ^  Po>
7 2
«VO ^ Pvi” Ppo~ Pc ^ 170 184
«vo'Pvi' Pc'Ppo^ Pc>
9 7
«vo'Pvi^ Pc'Ppo' Pc>
7 2
«vo<Pvi^ Pc-Ppo*' Pc> ^
0 0
«VO ^ Pvo~Pc^Ppo~Pvi”Pc^ 170
184
«VO ^ Pvo“Pc^Pv i ^ c, Ppo""Pc ^ 3
1
«V0 'Pvo=Pc/Pvi=Pc 'Ppo*'Pc> 9
7
«VO ^ Pvo”Pc^Pvi^Pc'Ppo^Pc^ 0 0
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TABLE XII
Reliability Parameters for Disbursement 
Voucher Review for Price
First
Period
Second
Period
Percentage
Difference
0.9624 0.9896 2.8
0.9497 0.9634 1.4
P'Spo/Svi' 1.0 1.0 0.0
So> 1.0 1.0 0.0
PISc/Svi* Spg, 0.4286 0.5 16.7
P'Sc/Svl" Spo» 1.0 1.0 0.0
P(VSvi"So>
unde­
fined
unde­
fined -
Predicted
0.9812 0.9955 1.5
"'^ vo'
Direct
0.9785 0.9948 1.7
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which channel's information is correct.
3. Inventory Pricing; A Performance 
Component with two Input Channels
The function of this component is to determine the 
value of inventory by multiplying p^^ (the price on the dis­
bursement voucher) with ( the quantity on the disbursement 
voucher). Thus it has two input channels : one being the in­
formation on and the other being information on q^s
(see Fig.34). A reliability model for a performance component 
with two input channels was developed in Chapter II (Propo­
sition 2). But the assumption made then that the two channels 
are independent is not valid here. In the present case the 
two channels have 100% overlapping data. Therefore, the re­
liability model developed earlier (Eq. 11-10) in Chapter II 
can not be used for this component. However, the result of 
Eq.(II-8), which is a general result, can still be used in the 
present case in developing a reliability model. The details 
of this procedure are presented below.
VO
,Voucher 
price
“VO
Voucher
quantity
pxq
Inventory value
Figure 34: Logic diagram for inventory pricing.
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‘ Theoretical Model ; Rewriting Eq, (.11-8). j.n the follow­
ing form, one gets the reliability model for the present com­
ponent ;
(V-18)
where the different symbols are defined as follows:
- The inventory is valued correctly i.e. pxq =
Pc*9c'
Syjp)- The price on the disbursement voucher is cor­
rect, i.e. p^Q = p^ .
Sy^q)- The quantity on the disbursement voucher is 
correct; i.e. q^Q = q^ .
S - The performance component performs its task 
correctly, i.e. it multiplies p^^ and q^Q 
correctly.
and
^ ^ i^nv^  " Probability that the inventory
is valued properly.
P[S^^(p)j - Probability that P^^ = P^ .
P fs^ Jq)/Svc(P)l - Probability that q^^ = q^ given
that = P^ .
P[s/S.^ jP) n - Probability that the multiplica­
tion process is completed proper­
ly given that P ^  = P  ^& q^o = q^ ' 
The above probabilities can be evaluated by the follow­
ing estimators.
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= V'Pvo' Pc'^vo' «o>/"vo (V-19)
P[Svo'pO = «vo'Pvo' fc'/^vo (V-20)
^vo^'^o” *^ c^ v^o fu
where Ns are defined in Table VII. The results of the field 
study are discussed below.
Field Study Results ; The data were taken from 'the 
same sample that was used in the previous cases. The first 
period data are used to evaluate the reliability parameters 
of the system. These parameter values were then used in the 
reliability model to predict the reliability of the output in­
formation for the second period. This result is compared with 
the directly measured value from the data of the second peri­
od. The number of disbursement vouchers were determined for 
the two periods for the given conditions and are listed in 
Table XIII. Using these numbers and Eqs. (V-19) - (V-22.) the 
reliability parameters of the system for the two periods were 
calculated and presented in Table XIV.
It is observed again that the system is stable during 
the two periods as the values of the reliability parameters 
for the two periods are within 3.5% of each other (see Table
TABLE XIII
Number of Disbursement Vouchers with 
Different Given Conditions
Ns First
Period
Second
Period
**vo 186 193
”vo'ï'vo*Pc> 182 192
162 174
V<'5vo' V P vo”Pc> 162 174
TABLE XIV
Reliability Parameters for Inventory Pricing
Component
Reliability
Parameters
First
Period
Second
Period
%
diff.
P[S,o<p)] 0.9785 0.9948 1.7
P[s^„(q)/S^o(p)J 0.8901 0.9063 1.8
PlSc/Svo(P) s^ o(q)] 1.0 1.0 0.0
P[S. ] Predicted inv.-* 0.871 0.9016 3.5
P[Sinv.] 0.871 0.9016 3.5
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XIV). The reliability parameters PtS^^(p)) and P ( q )
(p)), increased by 1,7% and 1,8%, respectively from the first 
period to the second period, whereas increased by
3,5%, If we assume that the process of multiplying with 
p^Q is always correct, then the predicted values of the reli­
ability of the value of inventory for the two period are in 
substantial agreement with direct values. In fact they are 
equal because of the assumption that the multiplication pro­
cess is always correct.
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The main purpose of the study as stated in Chapter I 
was to develop reliability models of internal control systems 
with different configurations and to show their usefulness in 
the design and analysis of a control system. In addition, the 
study was also intended to provide additional support (besides 
the intuitive reasoning and the limiting results) in validating 
some of the reliability models developed here, by conducting 
a field study. The above objectives have been fulfilled. A 
summary of the results and a discussion of the limitations of 
the study are presented in the following sections. Also some 
interesting problems for future research are presented.
A. Summary.
The recognition of the importance of internal accounting 
controls by the accounting profession (e.g. The American Insti­
tute of Certified Public Accountants, and The Institute on In­
ternal Auditors) has aroused interest in accounting academi­
cians to study control systems. In particular several attempts 
have been made to develop reliability models that would provide 
em objective way to evaluate internal control systems.
In Chapter II, a list of definitions of different terms
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used in the study, was presented. Also a step-by-step general 
procedure was described for developing reliability models of 
systems, subsystems or components.
Two types of components were recognized; performance 
type and control type. Reliability models for these components 
were developed for one-, two- and n- input information channels.
In the multi-channel input case, it was assumed that the dif­
ferent input channels are independent. This assumption is not 
valid in general. Therefore, separate models were developed 
for such cases in Chapter V for the field study.
The reliability models of the two components ('perfor­
mance' and 'control') with one and more than one input channel, 
were used in Chapter III as building blocks to develop relia­
bility models for more complex systems. The following configura­
tions were considered in the study for developing reliability 
models:
1. Performance components in series (Fig. 8).
2. Control components in series (Fig. 10).
3. Performance and control components in series (Fig. 15).
4. Control components in parallel (Fig. 16).
5. Performance components in parallel (Fig. 17).
6. 'Dual' control elements in series (Fig. 18).
7. 'Dual' performance elements in series (Fig. 20).
Several special cases were also considered. In all the
cases, the models yielded intuitively appealing results for the 
reliability of the output information. Limiting cases, where
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the parameters were either set to zero or one, were considered. 
This provides intuitive support for the model.
Sensitivity and structural analyses were discussed in 
Chapter IV. Through several examples, it was demonstrated 
that sensitivity analysis can provide information about the 
relative importance of different components and their reli­
ability parameters. Two approaches to achieve this goal were 
discussed. In the first, partial derivatives of the reliability 
of the final output data with respect to different parameters 
were evaluated and compared with, each other for a given set 
of values of parameters. The parameter for which the cor­
responding derivative was the largest, was determined to be 
the most important parameter for the system. This result meant 
that, for a given increase in the value of this parameter, the 
final reliability increased the most in comparison with a 
similar increase in any of the other parameters. In the other 
approach (Birnbaum d.9.6a) , a 'reliability importance ratio ma­
trix' was defined (see Sec. IV.A). The elements of one column 
were compared with the elements of thfe other columns. The para­
meter corresponding to the column that had the biggest elements, 
was the most important parameter. The second approach, though 
a bit more cumbersome than the first one, was found to be more 
direct.
It is worth emphasizing that the above result has im­
portant applications in the design and analysis of a control 
system. For example, it was shown in Chapter IV that the rela-
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tive importance of different parameters of a control system 
change when the configuration of the system changes or when 
the reliability of the input data is changed. An important 
application of this result is that a knowledge of the rela­
tively important parameters can help an internal auditing 
manager in concentrating his efforts and resources on improv­
ing those parameters that are relatively more important in 
order to achieve a higher output reliability. Also, an exter­
nal auditor can use this information in allocating his re­
sources to evaluate those parameters that will most influence 
the output reliability of the system.
A structural analysis of a control subsystem was also 
presented in Chapter IV to demonstrate the effects of changes 
in the structure of a subsystem on its output reliability. A 
control component that prepares receiving reports in an inven­
tory acquisition system, was considered for the analysis. Two 
possible structures of the component were analysed. In one 
structure, the material count was taken independent of the num­
ber on the vendor’s packing slip (i.e. counting was done before 
seeing the packing slip). In the other cases, the material . 
count was assumed to be dependent on the information on the pack­
ing slip (.i.e. counting was done after seeing the packing slip). 
The two models for the two structures were developed and dis­
cussed. It was argued on intuitive grounds that the parameter 
values of the control component would be significantly different 
in the two cases. This, in turn, would lead to significantly
173
different values of the output reliability. It was shown that 
for a given set of values of the control parameters, one struc­
ture was preferred oyer the other depending on the value of 
the input reliability. Analysis of this kind appears to be 
important to management and internal auditors who can use the 
results in the design and implementation of a control system.
It should be noted that a structural change may not involve 
much, cost, but may improve the output reliability significantly. 
For example, the structural change considered in the present 
study does not involve any cost, rather it influences the be­
havioral action of the 'task performer', the component.
Analysis of a reliability model of a given structure 
can also provide useful information to management. For example, 
management can set a goal for the level of reliability to be 
maintained in the output information. Any unfavorable deviation 
from this goal can become a serious threat to management ac­
tivity such as control of assets. Therefore, it is important 
that reasons for the deviations should be traced and the prob­
lems be eliminated by taking proper actions. Since, the relia­
bility of output information is constituted by the reliability 
of the input information and the reliability parameters of the 
system, it is not difficult to trace the source of the unfavor­
able deviation in output reliability. Once the source is known, 
its performance can be improved by providing proper training 
or by replacing the element.
A field study was conducted to provide empirical support
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of the reliability models developed here. The following control 
and performance components of an inventory acquisition system 
were chosen for the study:
1. Disbursement Voucher Review for Quantity: A single 
input control component (Fig. 32).
2. Disbursement Voucher Review for Price: A two input
control component (Fig. 33).
3. Inventory Pricing: A performance component with
two input channels (Fig. 34).
It should be mentioned that the last two compo- '- 
nents in the above list are not like the components with two 
input channels discussed in Chapter II, because the assumption 
that the two input channels are independent was not valid here. 
The reliability models, incorporating this dependency, were 
developed in Chapter V for these components (Nos. 2 and 3 in 
the above list).
The field data were divided into two periods of equal 
duration. The data of the two periods were used to determine 
the reliability parameters of the components. The values of 
the parameters for the two periods were compared for the sta­
bility of the system's performance. It was observed from this 
comparison that the system showed good stability over the two 
periods. The first period values of the parameters of aI compo­
nent were used to predict the reliability of the output data for 
the second period using the second period's input reliability 
(reliability of the input data). This result .was then compared
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with the value measured directly from the second period's 
data. In all the three cases, the predicted values were with­
in 1.8% of the directly estimated values. This suggests that 
the field study results support the reliability model derived 
here. However, a more detailed study is needed to validate 
the models statistically.
B. Limitations and Scope for Future Study 
Beside the limitations imposed by the explicit assump­
tions made during the development of the different reliability 
models here, there are other limitations of which one ought to 
be aware in order to effectively use these models. The following 
list presents such limitations:
(i) In the present study, reliability parameters of 
system components are considered to be time inde­
pendent. This assumption is not true in general.
For example, a person completing a task may not 
work with the same effectiveness when the work- 
stress is low (not much work) and when it is high. 
The dependence of the work-stress on the amount of 
business (i.e. volume of work) which, itself may 
depend, for example, on the time of the year, 
makes work-stress and consequently the reliabil­
ity parameters, time dependent. Learning curve 
effects i.e., improvement in reliability of per­
formance as one gains experience over time, may
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also cause time dependence. The time dependent 
characteristic of the reliability parameters can 
be incorporated in the models developed here, by 
developing cycle or learning curve dynamics or by 
restricting application of the model to conclusions 
about contemporaneous conditions.
(ii) Structures of internal accounting control systems 
may change over time. These structural'changes 
should be incorporated in the reliability models 
when evaluating the reliabilities . In addition 
assurance that the system tested is stable in de­
sign over time during opération should be obtained, 
(iii) Values of the reliability parameters of a control 
system change with a change in the control objec­
tive of the control system (the same control sys­
tem may be used for several control objectives). 
Moreover, the configuration of a control system 
for a control objective may also change when the 
control objective is changed. These changes may 
cause difficulty in evaluating the reliability 
parameters for different control objectives, and 
may make reliability modeling cost ineffective, 
(ivj A highly reliable control system may not necessa­
rily be what management wants. The ultimate in­
terest of management is in the dollar value impact 
of the non-reliability of a control system on the
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final dollar value of output information. Even 
though, a control system may be highly reliable for 
a given control objective, a single error that 
causes a significant impact on the dollar value 
of output information, can not be ignored from 
a decision maker's point of view. The reliability 
models developed here do not provide for the im­
pact of control failure on the dollar value of 
output information from a control system. Further 
research in this area seems warranted.
There are several research problems that are not dealt 
with, in the present work, but which should make interesting 
future projects. First of all, a comprehensive field study is 
needed to validate the models statistically. Weber (1982) has 
developed reliability models for asset safeguarding and main­
tenance of data integrity in EDP systems using Cushing's ap­
proach. He has considered only simple systems. With the use 
of the present work, Weber's work can be extended to more com­
plex systems. The present approach can also be applied to 
develop reliability models for collusion processes when several 
persons are involved. Theoretical works on probabilistic 
models of collusion processes are almost non-existent in the 
accounting literature. Bodnar (.1975) has very briefly dis­
cussed such, a model, but again was confronted with non-intu- 
itive results. Another area that can be further extended is 
the variance analysis of reliability parameters.
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Furthermore, since large scale internal accounting 
control systems that are now in common use were not analyzed 
in the present work, a complete analysis based on their re­
liability models would be useful for practicing accountants. 
Cost-benefit analysis is also important in the control design 
and implementation process. Therefore a study incorporating 
this aspect in the reliability model is needed.
C. Conclusion
This study has presented a general approach for devel­
oping a reliability model for any control system with any 
configuration. The reliability results obtained in the limit­
ing cases were shown to be intuitively appealing. The results 
of the field study also supported the models. Usefulness of 
the models were demonstrated through sensitivity and structural 
analyses.
FOOTNOTES
^The general meaning of engineering systems includes 
both thé electrical and physical systems.
2
The list representing the important differences is 
not necessarily complete. However, it illuminates most of 
the important differences.
3
Thé engineering systems that I am concerned with, here, 
are those which are used to borrow the reliability results.
In fact, there are more complex engineering systems where hu­
man interactions are considered (Smith and Green, 1981) but 
they are not of our interest for the present study.
4
The engineering systems considered here are those 
systems from which the reliability results have been borrowed. 
In a complex engineering system, decision making components 
are present, especially at the junction point of several par­
allel connected electronic components in a logic diagram. How­
ever, the reliability of such a component is usually assumed 
to be unity (Lerner 1981) and so one does not see the problem 
being investigated.
^In evaluating the reliability of an engineering com­
ponent, the failure duè to the wrong kind of input signal is 
excluded from consideration (See Amstadter 1971, p. 104) .
^An information channel is said to be redundant when 
only one channel's information is required to complete a 
process or task but several information channels are available.
n
There are several examples where this assumption is 
valid. For instance, in a payroll system (see Figure 9), the 
task of calculating gross pay by a performance component (a 
clerk) is independent of the state of the input information.
It should be noted that in situations where the assumption is 
not valid, one can use a general result with the conditional 
probabilities.
O
This can be justified by considering the example 
cited earlier in this section. In this example, a person 
computes the total cost of inventory by multiplying the quan­
tity received with the corresponding price. The correctness 
of the multiplication process does not depend on the state 
of the two inputs; the price and the quantity.
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This assumption can again be validated through an 
example. Consider a control component, a voucher clerk re­
viewing the voucher by comparing the information on the purr 
chase order, vendor's invoice and the receiving report. The 
process of reviewing the voucher represents the state (the
control is in operation). It is clear that the state that the 
review is in process does not depend on the correctness or 
incorrectness of the input information on the three documents.
^°Since X » 1 - + P (P - P )» X takes the following
v a l u e s  for all possible extreme values of P^, P^ and Pg:
X p p p_w c e
0 1 1 1
1 1 1 0
-1 1 0 1
0 1 0 0
1 0 1 1
1 0 1 0
1 0 0 1
1 0 0 0
comouter orogram (See Appendix A) was written to 
compute the output reliability for different n and different 
values of the reliabili^ parameters.
R^x"+ PgP^(l-x*')/(l-x) and x = 1-P^+ P^(Pg- Pg).
we want R S R for the control system to be functional, i.e. on ' 1 ,
or
or
or
Rix" + PgP^(l-x”)/(l-x)> R^
P^P„ ( l-x*') / ( 1-x) > R^  ( l-x*') e w
Vw') ■ V c  + V e ’
"ill - '■c +
This leads to the desired result.
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APPENDIX A
COMPUTER PROGRAM FOR CALCULATING OUTPUT 
RELIABILITY FOR A SYSTEM WITH CONTROL 
COMPONENTS IN SERIES
The computer program given below was used to compute 
values for the output reliability R^^ plotted in Figs. 11-14 
for the system shown in Fig. 10. The different values of the 
parameters used in the computation are given along with the 
corresponding curves in Figs. 11-14.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16 20
17 10
18 21
19 22
20
21
RI=O.S
PE=0.9
PW=1.0
PC=0.0
DPC=0.l
DO 10 1=1,10
PC=PC»DPC
X=1.0-PW»PW*IPC-PE)
Y=PW»PE
WRÎTÊ(6,22IR1,PC,PW,PE,X,X1,Y 
DO 20 N=l,10
*^'rQN=RI#XM>Y#(1.0-XNI/Xl 
WRITE(6,21IN,RON 
CONTINUE 
CONTINUE
F0RMAT(5X,I2,5X,F7.4I 
F0RMATax,7( F7.4,ixn 
STOP 
END
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APPENDIX B
COMPUTER PROGRAM FOR CALCULATING OUTPUT RELIABILITY 
FOR A SYSTEM WITH 'DUAL' ELEMENTS
The computer program given below was used to compute 
the values for the output reliability plotted in Figs.
22 - 25 for the systems shown in Figs. 18, 20, and 21, The
different values of the parameters used in the computation
are given with the corresponding curves.
SJOB
1 DIMENSION Rl 15)*SRU5)
2 RIsQ.B
3 PW=1«0
4 PC=0.8
5 PE=0.0
6 DPE=0.2
7 0W=1.0
I SrÎtIT6*51 »RI*PWfPC»QW,‘DC . •
10 DO 10 1=1*5
11 PE=PE*OPE
12 X=1.0-PW*PW*(PC-PEI
13 QlÊ=C.û
14 D01E=0.2
15 wRITE(6,52)"E,X
16 DO 20 J=l»5
17 QlE=aiE»DQlE
18 02E=0»0
19 CX=1•C-Cw*CW#(0C-2«0*01E»Q2E »
I? ____  ,
22 WRITEC6t51»3lEt02EtCXfY,Z
23 SR(l»=RI
24 R(11=0.0
25 DO 40 M=2tl5
26 R(M»=0.0
II 11
li SR mNÏ=R(NNl**2»CX *2.0*R (NN»«Y*Z
34 WRITE16.53)NN»R(NN»*SRINNI
35 30 CONTINUE
II W  5 M x , 5 , F 7 . 4 , l X n
40 53 FORMAT(7xÎI3^2ÎF8.4!iX)»
tï K g '
SEXEC
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